R. vs. ATTA [1959]DLCA2047

Date	1959-10-05
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1959]DLCA2047

VAN LARE J.A. AS C.J.

GRANVILLE SHARP J.A

OLLENNU J.

[1959]DLCA2047
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:
115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:Times;
mso-bidi-font-family:Times;color:#548DD4;mso-themecolor:text2;mso-themetint:
153">R. <o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:
115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:Times;
mso-bidi-font-family:Times;color:#548DD4;mso-themecolor:text2;mso-themetint:
153">vs. <o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:
115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:Times;
mso-bidi-font-family:Times;color:#548DD4;mso-themecolor:text2;mso-themetint:
153">ATTA<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[COURT OF APPEAL]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1959] GLR 337<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
5TH OCTOBER, 1959.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

VAN LARE J.A. AS C.J., GRANVILLE SHARP
J.A. AND OLLENNU J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF GRANVILLE SHARP J.A.<o:p></o:p>Granville
Sharp J.A. delivered the judgment of the Court:<o:p></o:p>The only
point raised in support of this appeal is that the learned Judge, who sat with
assessors, misdirected himself as to the law relating to provocation, the
argument of learned counsel for the appellant being that if the learned Judge
had properly directed himself in this regard he would have adjudged the
appellant guilty not of murder but of manslaughter.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>(His
lordships stated the facts, and proceeded:)<o:p></o:p>Thus the
issue for the consideration of the assessors and the learned Judge-and the only
issue - was whether the provocation alleged (that is to say, provocation as our
law understands the term) was such as, in the circumstances, sufficed to reduce
the appellant’s crime from murder to manslaughter.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In his
summing up to the assessors on this issue the learned Judge appears to have
proceeded with considerable care. He drew their attention to the law and read
to them every section of the Criminal Code that could assist them in their deliberations,
and he did not neglect to explain to them for the purposes of section 252(1)(d)
that “‘an ordinary person” shall mean an ordinary person of the community to
which the accused belongs.’ He then proceeded to deal with, and to comment
upon, the evidence, and he left the matter to them with the following
concluding direction:- “If the deceased only used words of abuse and slapped
accused on the face, would this be sufficient provocation? You may think not.
Alternatively, if you think that accused’s story is true and that deceased
attacked him with a cutlass, would this be sufficient provocation?”<o:p></o:p>With very
great respect to the learned Judge, we think that at this stage his summing-up
became incomplete. We think that he should have put it more clearly that what
they had to consider was whether the words of abuse and an accompanying slap on
the face would, in their view, be likely to deprive the accused (as a person of
ordinary character, and being in the circumstance in which he was) of the power
of self-control. Such a direction necessarily involves the question whether the
accused was a person of ordinary character. It involves also an examination of
the circumstances in which he was (which words include a consideration of his
general circumstances) and of the community to which he belonged. We felt that
it was a mistake at this stage to leave the assessors with an incomplete
understanding, of’ what it was that they had to consider, and at the same time
to be little the idea of provocation in this connection with the words, “you
may think not.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>One of
the three assessors gave it as his opinion that the appellant had acted under
provocation, as appears from the fact that he said the offence was
manslaughter. The others said that it was murder.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In his judgment
the learned Judge, after describing the quarrel between the appellant and his
wife as “a t</main>