IN RE OKINE & ORS [1959]DLHC2014

Date	1959-01-10
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1959]DLHC2014

SMITH J.

DR. DANQUAH (WITH HIM KOI LARBI) FOR APPLICANTS.

CRABBE FOR RESPONDENTS.

[1959]DLHC2014
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:
115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:Times;
mso-bidi-font-family:Times;color:#548DD4;mso-themecolor:text2;mso-themetint:
153">IN RE OKINE &amp; ORS<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[HIGH COURT (LANDS DIVISION), ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1959] GLR 1<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
10TH JANUARY, 1959..<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

DR.
DANQUAH (WITH HIM KOI LARBI) FOR APPLICANTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

SMITH J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF SMITH J.<o:p></o:p>(His
Lordship stated the facts, and proceeded:-)<o:p></o:p>The
Preventive Detention Act, 1958, is analogous to the Preventive Detention
Regulations which were in force in Britain as a war-time measure, and the cases
and authorities cited to me have almost entirely related to war-time
detentions.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
Preventive Detention Order sets out that the Governor-General is satisfied that
it is necessary to make the Detention Order in question. It was signed by the
Minister of Defence: there is nothing against his signing this order, either in
law or in the circumstances of this case.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
question of the necessity of making the order at all is not for the Court to
consider (Progressive Supply Company Ltd. v. Dalton ([1943 Ch. 54)). It appears
well established that where a statute requires only that a Minister shall be
“satisfied” that certain action is necessary, the effect is “virtually to
exclude all judicial review on the ground that Ministerial action taken under
(such) authority is purely administrative” (Laws and Orders -Sir Carleton Kemp
Allen). Many cases and authorities have been cited in support of this.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In Land
Realization Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster-General ([1950] Ch. 435 at p.440) Lord Romer
said, “It is well settled that where a statutory provision empowers a Minister
to do something if he is satisfied with regard to a certain state of affairs,
then a statement by him that he is so satisfied will be accepted in these
Courts.” Reference may be made also to the case of In re an Application by Beck
and Pollitzer and others and in re the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act,
1945 ([1948] 2 K. B. 339); and to the case of Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd. v.
Lloyd-George ((1943) 2 All E.R. 547).<o:p></o:p>In the
case of Liversidge v. Anderson and anor. (1942) A.C. 206) the argument turned
on the words used in the regulations, “If the Minister has reasonable cause to
believe.” Viscount Maugham, referring to certain regulations where the word
“satisfied” was used, said: “In these cases it is conceded that there is no
recourse to the court provided, of course, that the Secretary of State acts in
good faith.” Lord Atkin, who gave a dissenting judgment in that case, also
referred to certain regulations where the word “satisfied” is used, in contrast
to certain other regulations which used the words “reasonable cause.” As
regards the former he said, “In all these cases it is plain that unlimited
discretion is given to the Secretary of State assuming, as everyone does that
he acts in good faith.” The same principle was reasserted by the English Court
of Appeal in the post-war case of In re City of Plymouth (City Centre)
Declaratory Order, 1946, Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning
([1947] K. B. 702).<o:p></o:p>From
these and other cases cited to me it seems clear that, as regards the
Preventive Detention Act, 1958, the only matters that the Court can inquire
into are matters relevant to the legality of the detention. In the case of
Carltona Ltd. v. Commrs. of Works and ors.<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;((1943) 2 All. E.R. 560 at p.564) there is the
following passage in the judgment of Lord Greene M.R.,<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“It has
been decided as clearly as anything can be decided that, where a regulation of
this kind commits to an executive authority the decision of what is necessary
or expedient and that authority makes the decision, it is not competent to the
Courts to investigate the grounds or the reasonableness of the decision in the
absence of an allegation of bad faith</main>