COMMISSIONER OF POLICE vs. BLANKSON AND OTHERS [1960]DLHC132

Date	1960-01-13
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1960]DLHC132

SMITH J.

BAIDOO FOR APPELLANTS.

AKIWUMI FOR RESPONDENT.

[1960]DLHC132
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >COMMISSIONER OF POLICE <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>BLANKSON AND OTHERS<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[HIGH
COURT, SEKONDI]<o:p></o:p>[1960] GLR 1<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

DATE:
13TH JANUARY, 1960.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

BAIDOO FOR APPELLANTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

SMITH J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF SMITH J.<o:p></o:p>(His
lordship referred to the facts, and continued):<o:p></o:p>The
learned magistrate was wrong in the way he dealt with the matter. I refer to
the cases of R.v. Murray ([1951] 1 K.B. 391) and R.v. Francis and Another (43
Cr. App. R. 174).<o:p></o:p>In the
former case Lord Goddard, C.J. said:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“The
Recorder was wrong in the course which he took. It was quite right for him to
hear evidence in the absence of the jury and to decide on the admissibility of
the confession; and, since he could find nothing in the evidence to cause him
to think that the confession had been improperly obtained, to admit it. But its
weight and value were matters for the jury, and in considering such matters
they were entitled to take into account the opinion which they had formed on
the way in which it had been obtained. Mr. Hooper was perfectly entitled to
cross-examine the police again in the presence of the jury as to the
circumstances in which the confession was obtained, and to try again to show
that it had been obtained by means of a promise or favour. If he could have
persuaded the jury of that, he was entitled to say to them: ‘You ought to
disregard the confession, because its weight is a matter for you’.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In the
Magistrate’s Court, of course, the only procedure required would be to hear
evidence at the time of the objection, and on that to decide on the
admissibility of the confession.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In face
of an objection of the kind that was made the admissibility of the statements
in question depended on a finding of fact by the magistrate whether or not
there were any grounds for counsel’s objection. Defending counsel should have
been invited, when the police officer was in the box, to cross-examine that
witness there and then, and to call any evidence at his disposal, including (if
he so desired) the accused persons on this particular point. The prosecution
likewise at that juncture would have called their witness who was present at
the taking of the statement. It would only be in the light of evidence given
that the trial magistrate could decide at that stage whether the statements
were made voluntarily, and were therefore admissible. And in the circumstances
of this case it would have been proper for the learned magistrate to rule that
a prima facie case had been made out, and to put the prisoners on their
defence, only if he had recorded first a finding on the facts (after taking
evidence in the way I have outlined) whether or not the statements were
properly obtained, and therefore to be admitted.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The other
main grounds of this appeal arise out of this fundamental issue, and are
covered by this judgment. It is not necessary in the circumstances to consider
the question whether the magistrate was right in holding that P.W.19 (Joseph
Andrews Cobbina) was not an accomplice. I should be reluctant to differ from
the magistrate on this matter of fact.<o:p></o:p>As
regards the 8th accused, I should perhaps say one word. He was convicted of the
offence of dishonestly receiving cocoa. The same objection as in the case of
the others was made as regards his statement to the police. He also called
evidence to prove the source of the cocoa supplied to him. The stolen cocoa was
never identified, and as Crown counsel observed, when the accused put the
identity of the cocoa which he had in issue it was incumbent on the prosecution
to prove that the cocoa which he had and which he disposed of was, in fact, the
cocoa which had been stolen.<o:p></o:p>