AMPOFO BROS. v. BRONG-AHAFO CORPORATION LTD., AND ANOTHER [1961]DLHC584

Date	1961-01-16
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1961]DLHC584

CHARLES J

[1961]DLHC584
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&nbsp;BRONG-AHAFO CORPORATION
LTD., AND ANOTHER

&nbsp;[HIGH COURT, SUNYANI]

[1961] 1 GLR 62

DATE: 16TH JANUARY, 1961.

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COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp;

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CHARLES, J.

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&nbsp;

This application is for an order to review the order of this court
made on the 14th November, 1960 under Order 57, rule 10, of the Supreme Court
(Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954, and for an order for pleadings under Order 57,
rule 7. The order under Order 57, rule 7 can in these circumstances only be
made after a review of the order dated the 14th November, 1960.

The facts relied upon in this present application are stated in
extenso in the affidavit deposed to by Mr. D. E. G. Brookman. On the 14th
November, 1960, when the judgment-creditors’ application under Order 57, rule
10, came before the court, Mr. D. E. G. Brookman who did not appear to have had
any or sufficient instructions announced himself as appearing for the
claimants. He stated: “I am opposing the application on the ground that we are
owners of the subject-matter in dispute.”

This statement by counsel for the claimants was beside the point
because the application which was considered on the 14th November, 1960, was in
respect of the failure of the claimants to appear or their neglect or refusal
to obey the summons of the deputy sheriff which was served on them on the 27th
October, 1960.

The application by the judgment-creditors under Order 57, rule 10,
proceeded on the assumption that the claimants had at some date prior to the
14th November, 1960, failed to appear and state the nature and particulars of
their claim to the goods and articles seized by the deputy sheriff. That
application was on notice and the claimants were served with the notice of the
hearing as far back as the 27th October, 1960; so that at the hearing on the
14th November, 1960, the claimants knew of the deputy sheriff’s summons and yet
they did not call attention to it; neither did they oppose the
judgment-creditors application on the ground that it was premature.

The main ground for this present application appears to be that
stated in paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support of the motion. Paragraph 10
reads as follows:—

The grounds on which a judge can review his judgment are contained
in Order 39, rule 1, and the question here for determination is whether an
erroneous view of the law can be a sufficient reason for the review of an order
made hereby.

What the claimants-applicants are asking me to do is to reconsider
the legal position as it existed on the 14th November, 1960, and then to review
the order I made on that day. I am afraid that I am unable to do this, as I am
of the opinion that a misapprehension of the law is no ground for review under
Order 39, rule 1. In the case of Yanney v. African Veneer Mahogany Exporters,
Ltd 1(1)a trial judge reviewed his previous judgment after reconsidering a
point of law brought to his notice. In delivering the judgment of the Ghana
Court of Appeal, van Lare, J.A. said:

“In the instant case we are unable to say that there was a
discovery of a new and important matter. The learned judge must be taken to
have considered that a reconsideration by him of a point of law brought to his
notice during the trial and before judgment (viz., the effect of sections 2, 7,
8 and 10 of the Concessions Ordinance in connection with Concession Enquiry No.
2243 (Sekondi)), was a sufficient reason for his purported review. The learned
judge said as follows: ‘Since the delivery of the judgment I have had the
opportunity to peruse a certified true copy of the judgment in Civil Appeal No.
41/1950 (Concession Enquiry No. 2243 (Sekondi)), which was heard and determined
by the West African Court of Appeal on the 17th March, 1951, and also the case
of Thomas v. Sorrel (1673) 2 Keb. 372, 791 referred to in the said judgment. I
am satisfied that prima facie Exhibit “A” is a Concession, and under section 4
of the Concessions Ordinance it is subject to the said Ordinance.’ “We are
unable to</main>