CHEBIB vs. CHEBIB [1961]DLHC874

Date	1961-11-09
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1961]DLHC874

ACOLATSE J

J. QUASHIE-IDUN FOR THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT

A. CASELY-HAYFORD FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1961]DLHC874
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&nbsp;[HIGH COURT, ACCRA]

[1961] GLR 641

DATE: 9TH NOVEMBER, 1961.

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COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp;

J.
QUASHIE-IDUN FOR THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

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ACOLATSE, J.

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&nbsp;

The wife-applicant and the respondent in this motion were married
on the 14th September, 1947.

They lived and cohabited together in divers places and later in
Accra, Ghana, and had four children of the marriage. The wife petitioned for,
and on the 7th August, 1961 obtained in the High Court of Ghana a decree of
divorce on the ground of her husband’s adultery. The petitioner and the
respondent are domicled in Ghana.

The wife, in her petition to the court for the dissolution of her
marriage prayed inter alia (a) that she may be granted the custody of the
children of the said marriage, and (b) that she may be granted such secured
provisions and sums by way of maintenance for herself and the said children as
may be just.

The respondent, by consent, agreed to pay the petitioner the sum
of £G200 a month by way of maintenance for the petitioner and the four children
of the marriage. The said sum is made up as follows: “Maintenance for the
petitioner: £G60. Maintenance for the four children of the marriage (£G35
each): - £G140”. The sum of £G60 a month to be paid to the petitioner shall
cease in the event of the petitioner getting married at any time, and in case
of the boys on their attaining the age of 21 years, and in case of the girls
upon their getting married. Clause 5 of the consent settlement provides that
“All the sums payable under this consent order are hereby secured by the
respondent’s shares in the Standard Electric Company of Ghana”.

Consequent upon the terms of settlement reached and signed by the
solicitors for the parties and sworn to on the 23rd October, 1961, this
application was duly filed in the court on the 24th October, 1961. In it the
applicant sought from the court that the “consent” settlement for maintenance
be made a consent order in this suit and for an order that a conveyancer be
instructed to draw up a trust deed in respect of the matter contained in clause
5 of the settlement to secure the maintenance.

Mr. Casely-Hayford, counsel for the respondent, admitted the terms
of the consent settlement to be made an order for maintenance in this suit. His
objection is against the second part of the petitioner’s application for a
trust deed to be executed to secure the monthly payment of the maintenance in
respect of the specific shares the respondent holds in the Ghana Standard
Electric Company as security.

The heart of the whole argument lies in the interpretation of the
relevant statutory provisions now in force under section 19 (2) and (3) of the
Matrimonial Causes Act, 19501(1) and the authorities cited by counsel,
particularly Barker v. Barker2(2) and Rayden on Divorce, p. 1030. In the case
above mentioned the decision was that “a general charge on all of the
`husband’s assets’ securing the sums in the case for maintenance was highly
improper” as being at once “oppressive in effect, uncertain in operation,
difficult in enforcement and of doubtful validity”. In my view the above
decision as to the general charge upon all of the husband’s assets in that case
does not apply to this application.

This is an application directed mainly to the form of a specific
security proposed and offered by the respondent in respect of the shares he
holds specifically in the company, and the petitioner seeks the order of the
court for the proposal and offer and acceptance to be implemented in a deed to
secure the said monthly payment under clause 5 of the settlement as an asset
capable</main>