THE STATE vs. AMANKWA [1961]DLSC1293

Date	1961-12-22
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1961]DLSC1293

VAN LARE JSC

SARKODEE-ADOO JSC

ADUMUA-BOSSMAN JSC

K. Narayan for the appellant

K. Dua Sakyi with him Adjetey for the respondent (the State).

[1961]DLSC1293
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&nbsp;vs.

&nbsp;[SUPREME COURT]

[1961] GLR 783

DATE: 22ND DECEMBER, 1961.

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COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp;

K.
Narayan for the appellant.

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VAN LARE, SARKODEE-ADOO AND
ADUMUA-BOSSMAN, JJ.S.C.

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&nbsp;

Adumua-Bossman, J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court [His
lordship referred to the facts and the previous proceedings and continued:] The
well-reasoned conclusion of the trial judge is challenged by the appellant on
the main ground that the principal witness, the cashier, Joshua Okoe Tetteh,
P.W. 10 should have been treated as an accomplice whose evidence required
legally to be corroborated but was not. Learned counsel for the appellant
argued forcefully that the evidence available as to the cashier’s conduct
established that he was an accomplice; the conduct referred to was that: (1) he
entered up the cash requisition book (exhibit 1) as having requisitioned and
received £G1,000, indicating the denominations of money which were supplied to
him; (2) he wrote on the withdrawal form (exhibit B) that he identified P.W. 2
(Kofi Num) by his photograph; (3) he recorded in the savings account or
pass-book (exhibit A) that the £G1,000 was paid out by him to Num, and he
specified the denominations of money in which the payment was made; the
appellant had testified that the cashier requisitioned for £G1,000 and he
supplied him with the amount which he (the cashier) paid to Num, and the
appellant relied on the cashier’s own entries in the relevant documents to
support and establish his case. But even if that case was not believed, there
was nonetheless the obligation of the learned trial judge to consider whether,
having regard to the available evidence as to the cashier’s conduct in acting falsely
in the matter of entering up the material documents in relation to the
withdrawal of the £G1,000, he was not an accomplice. Counsel then went on to
cite some of the cases (Reekie v. The Queen1(1), Helwani v. C.O.P.2(2) and
Kassardjian v. The Queen3(3)) dealing with trials in which witnesses appear who
turn out to be accomplices, and counsel emphasised and stressed the court’s
obligation to have regard to the established rule of practice that
corroboration of the evidence of the accomplice by the evidence of other
independent witness or witnesses must be sought and found to be available,
before an accused can be properly convicted, and that the jury with whom the
judge is trying the case must clearly and expressly warned, as laid down in
hose cases. learned counsel placed special reliance on kassardjian v. The Queen
(Supra) in which the court referred to the English cases of R. v. Michael John
Davies in the house of Lords4(4) and the definition of an accomplice given by
Simonds, L.C. who in the course of his judgement said:

On the cases it would appear that the following persons, if called
as witnesses for the prosecution, have been treated as falling within the
category [of accomplices]: — On any view, persons who are participes criminis,
in respect of the actual crime charged, whether as principals or accessories
before or after the fact (in felonies); or persons committing, procuring or
aiding and abetting in the case of (in the case of misdemeanours).”5(5)

Applying the test laid down in that case and having regard to the
cashier’s admitted conduct in aiding in the withdrawal of the £G1,000, he must
be treated as an accomplice. Learned counsel concluded what the court shold
have first determined and made a pronouncement on whether Tetteh was an accomplice,
before proceeding to look for corroborative evidence.

The learned Director of Public Prosecutions in reply stated that
although the signing of the documents seem to indicate that Tetteh was
involved, yet as he gave explanations which the learned judge accepted, it
cannot be maintained that his finding is unreasonable. Upon a careful
consideration of the arguments on behalf of the appellant, we are of the
opinion that the question whether the cashier, (Tetteh), was an accomplice or
not, was essentially one of fact. We put the question to able counsel for the
appellant whether, assuming the explanations given by the cashier were
believed, he could be considered a particeps criminis and an accomplice, and
counsel honourably conceded he could not then be considered an accomplice, but
counsel insisted that from the available evidence it was not reasonably
possible to believe the cashier’s evidence and explanations. We are, however,
unable to agree with him in this view that from the available evidence it was
not reasonably possible to believe the cashier’s evidence, and from our own
careful and dispassionate study and consideration of all the available
evidence, we think there were good grounds for the learned trial judge’s saying
in relation to Tetteh that he was: “highly impressed by the demeanour of P.W.
10 who gave his evidence in a calm and convincing manner and I think that his
integrity is beyond reproach”. He also went on to find that Tetteh (P.W. 10)
“made the entries in exhibit A, particularly the entry of £G1,000, on the
instructions of the accused. I have no doubt that P.W. 10 made these entries
innocently on the directions of the accused.”

We are in entire agreement with the learned trial judge on that
finding, and it follows that there is no ground for treating Tetteh, P.W. 10,
as an accomplice. It is certainly a point in his (Tetteh’s) favour that it was
he who reported the irregularity, whereas if he had been involved, once the
account had been made up by the </main>