THE STATE vs. TENE DAGARTI [1961]DLSC1380

Date	1961-05-12
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1961]DLSC1380

VAN LARE JSC

SARKODEE-ADOO JSC

AKIWUMI JSC

B.K. TAMAKLOE FOR THE APPELLANT

K. DUA SAKYI FOR THE RESPONDENT (THE STATE).

[1961]DLSC1380
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<a name="_gjdgxs"></a>THE STATE

&nbsp;vs.

&nbsp;[SUPREME COURT]

[1961] GLR 224

DATE: 12TH MAY, 1961.

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COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp;

B.K.
TAMAKLOE FOR THE APPELLANT

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VAN LARE, SARKODEE-ADOO AND
AKIWUMI, JJ.S.C.

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&nbsp;

Van Lare J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. [His lordship
referred to the facts and continued:] The prisoner has appealed to this court
against his conviction and the substance of the arguments addressed before us
was whether there was an intent to kill in support of the conviction for
murder, the main point alleged being that the act of the prisoner can in the
circumstances amount to manslaughter only. An attempt was made to introduce the
question of provocation which we dismissed in the absence of what our law
regards as extenuating circumstances and matters which in law amount to such
provocation as to reduce murder to manslaughter. Our attention was attracted by
section 251(4) of Cap. 91(9), whereby the law regards.

as a matter which may amount to an extreme provocation to reduce
the offence of murder to manslaughter. As we were satisfied that the violent
assault and battery was not committed by the deceased upon one belonging to the
class of persons named in the section, and further that as the assault and
battery in question was not committed in the presence of the prisoner the
section would not avail him to reduce his offence to one of manslaughter.

It was also strongly submitted that on the case as a whole it
cannot be safely concluded that by his act the prisoner had a murderous intent
or intentionally caused the death of the deceased, although it cannot be denied
that he caused the death of the deceased. Such argument leads to a
consideration of the provisions of the law relating to intent.

The question put forward was that, as in this case the prisoner
was filled not necessarily with intent to revenge death but with intent to
cause grievous bodily harm only, although death ensued, was it murder or
manslaughter? We are of opinion that on the authorities the answer to the
question is that it is murder and not manslaughter. The test is an objective
one, and not a subjective one; that is, what a reasonable man would contemplate
as the probable result of his acts, and not what the prisoner in fact
contemplated as the probable result. The point is what would a reasonable man
contemplate to be probable result if he struck a person on the side of the
chest with a cudgel. This question of intent is well thrashed out in the recent
case of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith2(10) and it has been held that
in relation to the reasonable man,

“In judging of intent, however, it really denotes an ordinary man
capable of reasoning who is responsible and accountable for his actions and
this would be the sense in which it would be understood by a jury.”3(11)
Earlier the following appears which we quote with respectful approval: “The
unlawful and voluntary act must clearly be aimed at some one in order to
eliminate cases of negligence or of careless or dangerous driving. Once,
however, the jury are satisfied as to that, it matters not what the accused in
fact contemplated as the probable result, or whether he ever contemplated at
all, provided he was in law responsible and accountable for his actions, i.e.
was a man capable of forming an intent, not insane within the M’Naghten Rules
and not suffering from diminished responsibility. On the assumption that he is
so accountable for his actions, the sole question is whether the unlawful and
voluntary act was of such a kind that grievous bodily harm was the natural and
probable result. The only test available for this is what the ordinary,
responsible man would, in all the circumstances of the case, have contemplated
as the natural and probable results. That, indeed, has always been the law . .
.”4(12)

The court in D.P.P. v. Smith quoted with approval what Lord
Goddard said in the case of R. V. Ward.