AWUAH vs. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [1961]DLSC1986

Date	1961-02-08
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1961]DLSC1986

VAN LARE JSC

MILLS-ODOI JSC

BLAY JSC

APPELLANT IN PERSON

ANNAN

SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY

FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1961]DLSC1986
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AWUAH

[SUPREME COURT]

[1963] 1 GLR 64

DATE: 8TH FEBRUARY, 1963.

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COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp;

APPELLANT
IN PERSON.

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VAN LARE, MILLS-ODOI AND BLAY
JJ.S.C.

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&nbsp;

In its judgment read by van Lare J.S.C. the Supreme Court held
that the power of ordering recovery of property or its value is now regulated
by section 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), where the court
can be competent to do so only on the application of the victim, and even then
there is no longer power to order the seizure of the convicted person’s
property and sale simpliciter. The new enactment requires the court to “make a
decree for the return by the offender to the victim, of the property not
recovered and for payment, in default, of the value of any property not
returned.” One would therefore expect the decree to state the amount in respect
of which execution may be levied and there is provision for enforcement of such
a decree as if it were one in an action between the victim of the offence as
plaintiff and the offender as defendant.

Trial courts are therefore warned not to direct seizure and sale
of property of convicted persons simpliciter on their own motions, but to
proceed only under the new enactment, i.e. section 147 which is as follows:

“(1) Where sentence is imposed for an offence involving stealing
or dishonesty or both and any property including money is not recovered, the
Court, on sentencing the offender, may on the application of the victim of the
offence make a decree for the return by the offender to the victim, of the
property not recovered and for payment, in default, of the value of any
property not returned.

(2) A decree under this section shall be deemed to be an exercise
of the civil jurisdiction of the Court in an action between the victim of the
offence as plaintiff and the offender as defendant and shall be enforceable in
the same manner and be subject to the like appeal as are decrees for return of
chattels and for money.

(4) The Court shall have jurisdiction under this section
notwithstanding that the value of the property involved exceeds the limits of
the civil jurisdiction of the Court. (5) A decree under this section may be
enforced either during the term of the sentence imposed, or at any time within
ten years after the expiry thereof.”

It is important to remember that there should be application by
the victim and it would be necessary to settle or state specifically what
property shall be returned or in default the stated value thereof. The decree
should be one capable of enforcement as a judgment in a civil action in which
the execution is not by the court itself or by the prosecution but at the
instance of the victim in whose favour such decree has been made.

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