COMMISSIONER OF POLICE vs. ISAAC ANTWI [1961]DLSC877

Date	1961-06-26
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1961]DLSC877

KORSAH JSC

C. J. JSC

SARKODEE-ADOO JSC

AKIWUMI JSC

VICTOR OWUSU

WITH HIM HEWARD-MILLS FOR THE APPELLANT

K. DUA-SAKYI FOR THE RESPONDENT (THE STATE).

[1961]DLSC877
																																						<div class="restriction-wrapper">
														<div class="container-lg">
															<div class="row">
																<div class="col-md-12 restricted-content">
																	<div class="restricted-content-img-wrapper">
																		<div class="lock-icon bounce-7">
																			<img class=""
																				src="https://www.dennislawgh.com/dl-assets/dl-images/lock-content.png"
																				alt="Subscription based content">
																		</div>
																	</div>
																	 
																		<a href="https://www.dennislawgh.com/login"
																		class="btn btn-primary btn-lg"
																		style="font-family: 'open sans'; text-transform: capitalize; border-radius: 8px"> 
																		Login to Read Full Case </a>
																	 
																	
																</div>
															</div>
														</div>
													</div>
													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >

&nbsp;ISAAC ANTWI

&nbsp;[SUPREME COURT]

[1961] GLR 408

DATE: 26TH JUNE, 1961.

</div>

COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp;

VICTOR
OWUSU, WITH HIM HEWARD-MILLS FOR THE APPELLANT

K.
DUA-SAKYI FOR THE RESPONDENT (THE STATE).

</div>

KORSAH, C. J., SARKODEE-ADOO
AND AKIWUMI, J.J.S.C.

</div>

&nbsp;

Korsah C.J. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant was
convicted by the circuit judge at Kumasi on the 14th February, 1961, of
stealing by means of his employment, for that he during the months of May and
June, 1958, stole cash the sum of £G92, the property of the Ashanti Turf Club,
Limited, to which sum he had the means of access by reason of his office as a
managing director of the Ashanti Turf Club, and was sentenced to five months’
imprisonment with hard labour. At the trial the defence to the charge was that
from time to time monies were received from the cashier and the amounts jotted
down on paper and finally a voucher covering £G132 was prepared and signed by
the appellant; the amount so received was used in the Turf Club business in
which no receipts were taken and no receipts were in the circumstances
necessary. By the appellant’s service agreement he was authorised, inter alia,
to:

Learned counsel for the appellant argued ten grounds of appeal in
two groups, viz: grounds one and two together, and also grounds three to ten
together, and it will assist in understanding the case if we set these out in
extenso. They are as follows:

Particulars of misdirection Page 46, lines 1-6. `Apart from these
witnesses no evidence was led by the prosecution to disprove other payments and
rightly in law shifted the burden of proof onto the defence to prove payments
or to give an explanation as to payments reasonably probable of the truth.’
Page 51, lines 5-9. `I have considered the case for the prosecution and also
all aspects of the defence put forward by the accused as not reasonably
probable.’ “2. That the misdirection was all the more grievous considering that
the appellant was not charged with unlawful possession or receiving but
stealing where the onus is on the prosecution throughout to establish that the
accused stole, the burden of proof never shifting. “3. Apart from Duah, Gyimah
and Oppong who denied receiving money from accused (which denial is not
supported by the prosecution’s own evidence) the prosecution failed to
establish that the accused did not in fact use the money for the purposes he
alleged he used them. “4. The evidence even from the prosecution witnesses was
overwhelming regarding payments of money without obtaining receipts and the
trial circuit judge erred in holding this against the appellant to support his
conclusion that the appellant stole the money. “5. The charge being originally
in respect of £G132 and the prosecution having agreed that £G40 was accounted
for even though not supported by receipts the probability was that the rest of
the amount had been so expended without supporting receipts. This probability
the trial circuit judge failed completely to consider in favour of appellant.
“6. The trial circuit judge misdirected himself in many parts of his judgment
by posing questions such as this: `Defence counsel has not shown any reason why
I should not believe this witness’ (a prosecution witness). Surely it is for
the prosecution to bring such evidence as the court will believe and accept and
to show why they should be believed. “7. Even if Attiya was not Justman and the
evidence was overwhelming that he was, the trial circuit judge failed to
consider whether in fact there was a Justman who was in fact paid money by
accused seeing that in all of Justman’s letters he was in fact asking for sums
of money to effect all sorts of contacts. If in fact such a man existed then it
was immaterial whether Attiya was in fact this Justman or not. “8. Gyimah was
paid according to prosecution witnesses as publicity officer, Duah as security
officer and Oppong for propaganda work. No receipts or voucher were tendered by
the prosecution to support these payments and in the circumstance the only
inference reasonably probable of the truth is that they were paid these sums
out of the £G132; which inference makes the falsity of their denial that
accused paid them quite glaring. “9. Oppong in view of the conflicting
statements he made both in court and to the police should have been disbelieved
and the trial circuit judge’s attempt to reconcile these statements was to say
the least extremely naive. “10. The prosecution failed to prove its case with
that degree of certainty required in such cases to support a conviction.”

For the purposes of this judgment it is unnecessary to state the
facts of the case nor is it necessary to set out all the passages in the
learned circuit judge’s judgment which have been criticised by counsel for the
appellant in view of the detailed nature of the grounds of appeal.