COMMISSIONER OF POLICE vs. ANANE [1962]DLSC1409

Date	1962-10-26
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1962]DLSC1409

VAN LARE JSC

OLLENNU JSC

AKUFO-ADDO J.S.C.

SEKYI FOR THE APPELLANT.

HEWLETT FOR THE RESPONDENT (THE STATE).

[1962]DLSC1409
																																						<div class="restriction-wrapper">
														<div class="container-lg">
															<div class="row">
																<div class="col-md-12 restricted-content">
																	<div class="restricted-content-img-wrapper">
																		<div class="lock-icon bounce-7">
																			<img class=""
																				src="https://www.dennislawgh.com/dl-assets/dl-images/lock-content.png"
																				alt="Subscription based content">
																		</div>
																	</div>
																	 
																		<a href="https://www.dennislawgh.com/login"
																		class="btn btn-primary btn-lg"
																		style="font-family: 'open sans'; text-transform: capitalize; border-radius: 8px"> 
																		Login to Read Full Case </a>
																	 
																	
																</div>
															</div>
														</div>
													</div>
													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">COMMISSIONER OF POLICE <o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">vs. <o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">ANANE <o:p></o:p>[SUPREME COURT]<o:p></o:p>[1962] 2 GLR 107<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid black 1.5pt;
padding:31.0pt 31.0pt 1.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">

DATE:<span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0"> 26TH OCTOBER, 1962.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid black 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

SEKYI
FOR THE APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM: <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid black 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

VAN LARE, OLLENNU AND
AKUFO-ADDO, JJ.S.C.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF VAN
LARE J.S.C.<o:p></o:p>Van Lare J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. [His lordship
rehearsed the facts which are set out in the headnote and continued:] The
prosecution’s case is that the complainant was entitled to the whole of the
quantity of 1,004 bags delivered to the appellant and that by causing 314 bags
of such cement to be sold to other customers the appellant dishonestly
appropriated property of which he was not the owner. The trial circuit judge
appears to have accepted the prosecution’s contention that the ownership in the
314 bags was in the complainant and convicted the appellant. He based his
decision upon an assumption that the appellant had not denied receiving the
1,004 bags for and on account of the complainant. There is nothing from which
the trial circuit judge could infer such an assumption; on the contrary the
evidence is clear that the appellant contracted with the suppliers on his own
behalf and received the 1,004 bags on his own account and not on the account of
the complainant.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In this court learned Senior State Attorney has contended that the
appellant was in law an agent of the complainant when he took delivery of the
1,004 bags from his suppliers. With this contention we do not agree. The
evidence shows that the appellant was in no sense employed by the complainant
to transact any business with the Ghana Rural Industries Ltd. in respect of the
cement on the complainant’s behalf. The appellant cannot therefore be an agent
of the complainant. The evidence is that the appellant contracted to buy 3,000 bags
of cement from the suppliers at ten shillings a bag and contracted to sell a
quantity of the same to the complainant at seven shillings and sixpence a bag.
In either transaction the appellant acted as an independent contractor. Were
the appellant acting as the complainant’s agent the complainant would have been
expected to pay the price of ten shillings a bag for the cement and not seven
shillings and sixpence a bag.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>To convict upon a charge of stealing the act complained of against
the prisoner must amount to a dishonest appropriation or fraud. We find it
difficult to discover any criminal fraud in the appellants’ transaction with
the complainant as it is quite clear that the appellant honestly expected to
receive 3,000 bags of cement from the suppliers from which he was to supply to
the complainant the whole of the quantity to which his deposit of £G1,000 would
entitle him, which, reckoning at seven shillings and sixpence a bag, would have
been 2,666 2/3 bags. If the Ghana Rural Industries Ltd. had enough stock to
cover the 3,000 bags, the complainant would have also received cement to the
full value of his deposit. Even if the appellant had received the whole of the
3,000 bags and failed to deliver to the complainant cement to the total value
of £G1,000 he could not in law be held to have dishonestly appropriated goods
of which he was not the owner, nor could he have been guilty of any criminal
offence. He would surely have incurred a civil liability. In law the
complainant can claim ownership in the cement only when it is delivered to him
by the appellant in fulfilment of the contract between them. Although the legal
ownership in a thing may be in dispute between two persons and if one of them
nevertheless exercises acts of ownership in respect of the thing detrimental to
the other, the law does not regard that transaction as amounting to a dishonest
appropriation of that thing but rather as an exercise of a claim of right.
Thus, as an illustration with regard to the explanation of dishonest
appropriation, section 120 of our Criminal Code, 1960, gives the following:
“(c) A., during a lawsuit with B. as to the right to certain goods, uses or
sells some of the goods. Here A. is not guilty of stealing, because, although
A. believes that B. would object, yet A. acts under a claim of right.”<o:p></o:p>We are of opinion therefore that in this case even if the
appellant were to know that the complainant would object to his selling the 314
bags to other customers he cannot be held to have dishonestly appropriated
property which might be argued in law to be the property of the complainant.
But as we have already indicated the ownership in the 314 bags of cement,
subject-matter of the charge, never passed to the complainant but remained in
the appellant until he sold to the other customers.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In the result the trial circuit judge erred i</main>