ODIFIE vs. PANIN AND OTHERS [1964]DLHC1936

Date	1964-05-14
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1964]DLHC1936

SOWAH J.

WIREDU FOR THE APPELLANTS.

T. A. TOTOE FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1964]DLHC1936
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >ODIFIE <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>PANIN AND OTHERS <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, KUMASI]<o:p></o:p>[1964] GLR 317<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
14 MAY 1964.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

WIREDU FOR THE APPELLANTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

SOWAH J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.<o:p></o:p>The main
points argued in this appeal are points of law. Counsel however submitted that
in the case of the third appellant there was no evidence upon which she could
be found liable for uttering the slanderous words complained of.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>I propose
to deal firstly with the argument of law. Counsel has submitted that the law of
slander as known to customary law does not give damages as its relief or remedy
to the person slandered. The only remedy that an aggrieved person can obtain is
to get the court to impose a small fine which may be given to him by way of
compensation and further the court may order the slanderer to recant, that is
to say:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“... make
him walk through the town or village carrying a heavy stone in front of an
officer of the Court, who, at convenient halting-places, beats a gong; the
guilty slanderer is compelled to recant his base falsehoods, and to confess his
disgraceful behaviour, amid the sneers and jeers of the multitude.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>See
Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws (2nd ed.), p.114.<o:p></o:p>Learned
counsel cites the case of Kwaku v. Addo1 in support of his contention and
submits that the remedy or relief of damages is unknown to the customary law of
slander. Learned counsel relies on the words of Ollennu J. (as he then was) in
Kwaku v. Addo,2 “These words give the impression that [the] native customary
remedy for slander is more to penalize than merely to compensate.” Counsel
therefore submits that the local magistrate was wrong in awarding damages and
in any case the plaintiff was not entitled to damages as of right.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Learned
counsel was however faced with the judgment of Apaloo J. (as he then was) in
Wankyiwaa v. Wereduwaa.3 In this case Apaloo J. held that the customary law of
slander is wider than the common law of slander and that an action even lies
for vituperative words in certain circumstances. He also held that damages are
the proper remedy or relief.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Counsel
submitted that Apaloo J. never made those findings himself and that he relied
mainly on the findings of the local magistrate that vituperative words gave a
cause of action at law and if the action was successful damages could be
awarded. Counsel has criticised the following statement by Apaloo J. which
appeared in his judgment, “Judges who sat in this court and in the Supreme
Court have said time and again that native custom is peculiarly within the bosom
of the native courts.”4<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>I have
read the judgment of Apaloo J. quoted above and I must say that I agree with
counsel’s criticism in this respect, and in this respect only, namely, a decade
ago the passage quoted above would have been true having regard to the
constitution of the courts, the fact that persons who sat in those courts had
some knowledge of or informal education in customary law and also because the
courts were then constituted by chiefs, their linguists and the elders of the
society in which the courts were situated. It is however common knowledge that
the present day local magistrates are appointed from the populace at large
without much regard to this fact; they may or may not be learned in our local
customs. Indeed some have no knowledge whatsoever of customary law before their
appointment. To say of such persons that the principles of customary law are
embedded in their bosoms is to ask the ordinary man to stretch his imagination
a bit far.<o:p></o:p></main>