YEBOAH vs. THE STATE [1964]DLHC1958

Date	1964-12-28
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1964]DLHC1958

KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.

HAROLD DARKOH FOR THE APPELLANT.

R.D. AMOFA STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1964]DLHC1958
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >YEBOAH <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>THE STATE <o:p></o:p>[IN THE HIGH COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1964] GLR 715<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
28 DECEMBER 1964.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

HAROLD DARKOH FOR THE APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p>

R.D. AMOFA, STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.<o:p></o:p>This is
an appeal wherein the appellant who pleaded guilty to a charge of stealing
before the District Court, Accra, on 25 November 1964, and was duly convicted
and sentenced to a fine of £G25 or three months’ imprisonment with hard labour,
now prays that the said conviction and sentence be quashed, because, amongst
other things, the proceedings were irregular, the contention being that the
appellant was induced to change his plea from an original one of “not guilty”
to the one whereon he suffered the said conviction and sentence without
appreciating the effect of that latter plea of “guilty.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>On the
face of things it would appear that there is no remedy open to the appellant
because of the fact that he himself pleaded guilty. But an appellate court has
full right and power to look at all available evidence before it in order to
determine whether or not a miscarriage of justice has been wrought upon an
appellant. Where it is clear that no miscarriage of justice has been effected,
nothing will be done to upset the decision of the lower court. But where the
circumstances show that there is reasonable and compelling justification for
entertaining the petition because justice has miscarried, the appellate court
will step in to redress the appellant. It is a well-established and infrangible
principle of law that an appeal court has full right and inherent power, in the
interests of justice and fair-play, to go behind technicalities and do
substantial justice.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>After
giving due and anxious consideration to the arguments and submissions of both
learned counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, having especial
regard to exhibit A, I am satisfied and convinced that on the two occasions
prior to Wednesday 25 November 1964, when the appellant pleaded “guilty,” his
plea was a definite and consistent one of “not guilty.” On the first occasion
Saturday 14 November 1964, the appellant was granted bail and ordered to report
to the police, daily. On the second occasion Saturday 21 November 1964, it is
quite clear (although the district court’s records were silent on that point)
that the appellant must have pleaded “not guilty,” for he was, on that day
“discharged for want of prosecution.” It is highly inconceivable that the
appellant would have been so discharged if he had then pleaded “guilty.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It is
significant to note that on the third occasion, as on the two previous ones,
the appellant was all alone and by himself, unrepresented by any counsel.
Since, on that third occasion, as well as on the two previous occasions, the
appellant had not the benefit of counsel; and since, further, the appellant had
been arraigned before the very same district magistrate on all the three
previous occasions, it is my decided view that the said district magistrate, no
matter how busy he may have been, ought to have paused for judicial thought and
fully inquired into the circumstances surrounding and leading to the sudden
change of plea from “not guilty” to “guilty,” especially as the appellant had
previously been discharged, explaining to the appellant in the process of the
inquiry, the effect and consequences of his plea of “guilty.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It is my
considered view that our local, lay and district magistrates, and our circuit
judges, should always be mindful of the fact that justice is the better and
more beneficially administered to the general satisfaction of all concerned if
done carefully and painstakingly, rather than hurriedly and carelessly, with
one eye constantly on their returns.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It is
always more rewarding and meritorious to handle a few cases carefully, and
well, doing fair and proper justice to those concerned, than to rush through
one’s cases and have one’s returns showing that scores upon scores of cases
have been disposed of when in fact, true justice has been denied those
concerned and involved in those cases.<o:p></o:p></main>