ESSIEN vs. THE STATE [1965]DLHC1801

Date	1965-02-08
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1965]DLHC1801

DJABANOR J.

A. J. MARTIN FOR THE APPELLANT.

S. M. BOISON SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY (WITH HIM R.A. DARKO) FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1965]DLHC1801
																																						<div class="restriction-wrapper">
														<div class="container-lg">
															<div class="row">
																<div class="col-md-12 restricted-content">
																	<div class="restricted-content-img-wrapper">
																		<div class="lock-icon bounce-7">
																			<img class=""
																				src="https://www.dennislawgh.com/dl-assets/dl-images/lock-content.png"
																				alt="Subscription based content">
																		</div>
																	</div>
																	 
																		<a href="https://www.dennislawgh.com/login"
																		class="btn btn-primary btn-lg"
																		style="font-family: 'open sans'; text-transform: capitalize; border-radius: 8px"> 
																		Login to Read Full Case </a>
																	 
																	
																</div>
															</div>
														</div>
													</div>
													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >ESSIEN <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>THE STATE <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, SEKONDI]<o:p></o:p>[1965] GLR 44<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
8 FEBRUARY 1965.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

A. J. MARTIN FOR THE APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p>

S. M. BOISON, SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY (WITH HIM R.A.
DARKO) FOR THE RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

DJABANOR J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF DJABANOR J.<o:p></o:p>The question
for determination in this appeal is the correct interpretation of section 9(1)
of the Criminal/Code, 19601<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
appellant was charged on the same charge sheet with one count of dangerous
driving contrary to the Road Traffic Ordinance, 19522, and two counts of
negligently causing harm contrary to the Criminal Code, 1960. He was prosecuted
and found guilty and convicted on all three counts. He has appealed to this
court on the point of law that these counts are bad in law and fatal to the
conviction in that they sinned against the express provisions of section 9(1)
of Act 29 which provides:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“Where an
act constitutes an offence under two or more enactments the offender shall be
liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments
but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It is to
be observed that this section is identical with section 33 of the English
Interpretation Act, 18893. In a very forceful argument counsel for the
appellant submitted that the act is one act, i.e. an act of driving which has
been performed in a certain manner with a certain result, and that if the
section was interpreted according to its ordinary meaning then the one act
which constituted an offence under two enactments must not result in two
charges being preferred. The prosecution must elect under which enactment it
would prefer the charge.<o:p></o:p>It seems
to me that this argument was answered in the case of R.v. Thomas4. The facts of
that case were these: On 20 March 1949 a man inflicted serious wounds on his
wife with a knife and for that offence he was convicted on 3 May 1949 of
felonious wounding with intent to murder. At that time his wife was in hospital
where she died on 2 June 1949 from her wounds. In answer to an indictment for murder
the appellant pleaded autrefois convict which on the direction of the judge was
rejected. On appeal it was held that that plea was not maintainable. Reference
was made to the English Interpretation Act, 1889, s. 33 which is in the same
terms as our section 9 (1) of Act 29.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
principle which was borne in mind and which must be remembered in this case is
this, that it is not the law that a person shall not be punished twice for the
same act. The law is that a person shall not be punished twice for the same
offence. Bearing this in mind I would interpret section 9 (1) of Act 29 as
stating that where one act or omission constitutes one offence under two or
more enactments then the prosecution must charge and prosecute only under one
of the enactments. Here the one act constituted two offences-not one- under
different enactments, it was one offence under the Road Traffic Ordinance and
another offence under the Criminal Code. Thus possessing firearms without
authority is an offence under the Criminal Code and that same offence is known
under the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1962.5 In this case the prosecution must
elect under which enactment it will proceed.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>My
attention was drawn to the fact that this practice of prosecuting for these two
offences arising out of careless driving is not unknown in the superior courts
in this country as well as in England. I agree that that has been so.<o:p></o:p>In all
the circumstances I am of the opinion that the indictments are not bad in law
and that the convictions based on them are correct. The appeal is therefore
dismissed.<o:p></o:p>