STATE vs. BANFUL [1965]DLSC1854

Date	1965-06-04
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1965]DLSC1854

OLLENNU JSC

ACOLATSE JSC

APALOO J.S.C.

GYEKE-DAKO SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT.

AFREH FOR THE RESPONDENT

[1965]DLSC1854
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >STATE <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>BANFUL <o:p></o:p>[SUPREME COURT]<o:p></o:p>[1965] GLR 433<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
4 JUNE 1965.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

GYEKE-DAKO, SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE
APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

OLLENNU, ACOLATSE AND APALOO JJ.S.C.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF OLLENNU J.S.C.<o:p></o:p>Ollennu
J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. This appeal is brought by the
prosecution under section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code 19601 as amended
by section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) (No. 2) 1962,2 and it
is against three rulings made by Siriboe J., as he then was, one on 12 May
1964, one on 13 May 1964 and another on 19 May 1964. By the first ruling the
learned judge rejected as inadmissible a statutory statement which the
defendant, the respondent herein, had made before the committing magistrate; by
the second he refused to state a case for the consideration of the Supreme
Court on his first ruling; and by the third he ruled that there was no case to
go to the jury.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
defendant, a school boy aged about nineteen, was alleged to have murdered the
bursar of his school by gun shot wound. As many as 24 witnesses were called for
the prosecution, but none of them gave any material evidence direct or
circumstantial which connected the defendant with the cause of the bursar’s
death. The prosecution sought to tender a statement which the defendant had
made to a police officer who investigated the case; it was alleged that in that
statement the defendant confessed his guilt of the crime; the defence objected
to the admission of that statement and so the court had to try that issue. The
evidence led in that regard, which will be referred to presently, made it quite
conclusive that the alleged confession was not voluntary, and that it was one
induced by promise of favour or advantage and pressure held out and brought to
bear upon the mind of the defendant by a very senior police officer who
employed the aid of the father of the defendant jointly with the headmaster of
his school. During the trial of this issue, the prosecution put in issue the
admissibility of a statutory statement which the defendant had made, and
thereby elicited evidence which proved that the defendant made the statutory
statement while the promise held out to him to induce the extra-judicial
statement was still operating upon his mind, and nothing had happened, or had
been done to remove it. The learned judge ruled that the caution statement made
by the defendant to the police was inadmissible, and the trial proceeded.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Just
before closing their case the prosecution sought to tender in evidence the
statutory statement which the defendant made to the magistrate at his
committal. Counsel for the defence objected to its admissibility on the ground
that it had been proved not to be a voluntary statement, but rather one made
upon the influence of the earlier promise and pressure. Having heard arguments
on this point based upon the evidence already adduced, the learned judge upheld
the objection in the following words, “I feel bound to reject this statutory
statement sought to be tendered on the ground that it was made by the accused
in consequence of the previous inducement or promise which was still operating
on his mind, hoping as he put it, that he would be freed if he made that
statement.” That ruling is the first ruling against which the appeal is
brought.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>After
this ruling the prosecution requested the learned judge to state a case for the
consideration of this court, but the judge refused to do so. The prosecution
then had their twentieth witness, the father of the defendant, recalled for
further examination, and with that, they closed their case. A submission of no
case was then made on behalf of the defence, and having heard arguments on both
sides, the learned judge ruled that there was no case to go to the jury. He
then directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty; which the jury did;
the learned judge then recorded the verdict and acquitted and discharged the
defendant.<o:p></o:p>The
prosecution appealed against these three rulings on the following grounds:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“(1) That
the learned trial judge was wrong in rejecting the statutory statement made in
accordance with section 187 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), by
the accused before the district magistrate at the preliminary hearing of the
case. <o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(2) That
the learned trial judge was wrong in h</main>