STATE vs. YANKEY [1966]DLHC1762

Date	1966-02-25
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1966]DLHC1762

ARCHER J.

P. V. A. ADJETEY STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT…

I. G. CARSON FOR THE RESPONDENT

[1966]DLHC1762
																																						<div class="restriction-wrapper">
														<div class="container-lg">
															<div class="row">
																<div class="col-md-12 restricted-content">
																	<div class="restricted-content-img-wrapper">
																		<div class="lock-icon bounce-7">
																			<img class=""
																				src="https://www.dennislawgh.com/dl-assets/dl-images/lock-content.png"
																				alt="Subscription based content">
																		</div>
																	</div>
																	 
																		<a href="https://www.dennislawgh.com/login"
																		class="btn btn-primary btn-lg"
																		style="font-family: 'open sans'; text-transform: capitalize; border-radius: 8px"> 
																		Login to Read Full Case </a>
																	 
																	
																</div>
															</div>
														</div>
													</div>
													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >STATE<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;vs. <o:p></o:p>YANKEY <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, CAPE COAST]<o:p></o:p>[1966] GLR 208<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
25 FEBRUARY
1966.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

P. V. A. ADJETEY, STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE
APPELLANT…<o:p></o:p>

I. G. CARSON FOR THE RESPONDENT<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

ARCHER J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.<o:p></o:p>The
respondent was charged with careless driving under section 18 (1) of the Road
Traffic Ordinance, 1952.1 The particulars of the charge or offence were that on
1 July 1965 at University Road, Cape Coast, in the Cape Coast magisterial
district, he did drive a certain motor vehicle No. GE 6449 on the road without
due care and attention.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>At the
trial the respondent pleaded not guilty and his counsel raised the point which
according to the record of proceedings reads:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“Counsel
raises the point that the ‘University Road’ is not a public road and cites
Buchanan v. Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1955] 1 All E.R. 607. This court could not
agree less than what McNair J. has said in that case. This court is bound to
follow.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In the
circumstances the accused was acquitted and discharged. The State has appealed
against the acquittal of the respondent on the ground that the learned
magistrate erred in holding that the University College of Cape Coast roads are
not roads for the purposes of the Road Traffic Ordinance. The learned state
attorney submitted that the roads at the University College at Cape Coast come
within the definition of road in the Road Traffic Ordinance, and that the
learned district magistrate was not bound by the decision in the English case
of Buchanan v. Motor Insurers’ Bureau.2 Moreover the facts in that case are
distinguishable from the facts in the present appeal and the learned magistrate
misapplied the decision. The accident happened after a dance at the University
College to which the public had been invited.<o:p></o:p>For the
respondent, his learned counsel argued that unauthorised persons are not
allowed at the University College and that the people who attended the dance
were there at the express invitation of the university, and the public as such
have no access to these roads except by permission.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Before I
deal with these arguments, I wish to remark that in the particulars of offence,
the road is described as “University Road” as if there is such a road. The
learned trial magistrate appears also to have in mind the “University Road” in his
ruling. I have been in this town only a few months and I have not yet come
across any road known as the University Road. Nevertheless the ground of appeal
seems to throw some light on the matter and I therefore take it for granted
that the road in question is one of the many roads in the area occupied by the
University College. The word “road” is defined in our Road Traffic Ordinance.
[His lordship here read the definition of “road” in section 2 (1) of the Road
Traffic ordinance as set out in the headnote and continued:]<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It is
patent that the definition is very wide but I think the ultimate criterion in
determining whether or not a place is road within the definition of the
Ordinance, is the access to the place by the public. I shall therefore
concentrate on the words “to which the public have access.” Section 121 (1) of
the English Road Traffic Act, 1930,3 defines road as follows: “Road means any
highway and any other road to which the public have access and includes bridges
over which a road passes.” It is obvious from these words that the definition
of road in the English Road Traffic Act is too narrow but there appears also
the words “to which the public have access.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The Ghana
Ordinance is modelled on the English Act and I think it is</main>