AIKINS ALIAS MENSAH vs. THE STATE [1966]DLSC1642

Date	1966-02-14
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1966]DLSC1642

CRABBE JSC

APALOO JSC

SIRIBOE J.S.C.

THE APPELLANT IN PERSON.

K. A. SEKYI STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1966]DLSC1642
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >AIKINS ALIAS MENSAH<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;vs. <o:p></o:p>THE STATE <o:p></o:p>[SUPREME COURT]<o:p></o:p>[1966] GLR 170<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
14 FEBRUARY 1966.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

THE APPELLANT IN PERSON.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

CRABBE, APALOO AND SIRIBOE JJ.S.C.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF CRABBE J.S.C.<o:p></o:p>Crabbe J.S.C.
delivered the judgment of the court. On 4 June 1965, the applicant was
convicted by the learned district magistrate at Tarkwa on a charge of
pretending to be a public officer, contrary to section 237 of the Criminal
Code, 1960.1 He was remanded in custody to give the police time to investigate
his past record, and at a subsequent hearing he admitted four previous
convictions for fraud and four others for stealing. When pleading for leniency
he said that he had been moving with bad friends. Thereupon, the learned
district magistrate, acting under section 3 (1) of the Punishment of Habitual
Criminals Act, 1963,2 committed the applicant to the High Court, Sekondi, for
sentence. This subsection reads as follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“Where
the Court by which an offender to whom paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1)
of section 1 of this Act apply is convicted is a Circuit Court, District Court
or Local Court, the Court shall not pass sentence upon him but shall commit him
for sentence to the High Court, and any enactment relating to the powers of any
Court upon committal for trial shall apply, so far as is relevant, to the
committal for sentence.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In the
opinion of this court the first duty of the High Court when a convicted person
is committed under that subsection is to satisfy itself that the case is one
which attracts paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of section 1 of the
Act. If the court is so satisfied then it will have to exercise its functions
under paragraph (c) of the same subsection of section 1 in order to determine
whether it is a proper case in which to pass the irreducible minimum sentence
of ten years in preventive custody with productive hard labour.<o:p></o:p>In this
case the applicant was brought before Koranteng-Addow J. sitting at the High
Court, Sekondi, on 20 July 1965. Before the applicant was sentenced, the state
attorney stated that the applicant had ten previous convictions, four for
stealing, four for fraud by false pretences, and two for pretending to be a
public officer. He was last sentenced on 15 February 1965 on conviction for
pretending to be a public officer. This is certainly not a good record. The
applicant was a pupil teacher, and his age was given as 31 years. Without
making any inquiry into the circumstances of the case, as he was bound to under
section 1 (1) (c) of the Act, the learned judge said:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“This is
a bad case but I do not think any useful purpose will be served in putting the
convict into prison for as long as ten years. He may yet reform. I shall
therefore not treat him under the Punishment of Habitual Criminals Act, 1963
(Act 192). I sentence him to five years’ imprisonment with hard labour.
Sentence to run from 4 June 1965.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>There
were before this court two applications by the applicant: one for an extension
of time within which to appeal, and another for leave to appeal against
sentence. We granted the application for extension, and as we were of the
opinion that this case raised an important point on the construction of the
Punishment of Habitual Criminals Act, 1963, we treated the application for
leave to appeal as an appeal against sentence.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
appellant was unrepresented, and after the Court had had some discussion with
the state attorney, the court came to the conclusion that, with all due
respect, the learned judge had not fully performed his functions under section
1 (1) of the Act. This is one of the few cases which have come to this court in
which some of the High Court judges have, with the greatest respect, dealt with
the matter with an equal degree of casualness. We therefore feel that it is our
duty to examine the object and the various provisions of the Act with a view to
giving some clear guidance to the lower courts as to the application of the
Act.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>