PRACTICE NOTE: DAVIES vs. THE STATE [1967]DLHC1532

Date	1967-08-10
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1967]DLHC1532

ARCHER J.

K. A. SARPONG FOR THE APPELLANT.

AMUI ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1967]DLHC1532
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >PRACTICE NOTE: DAVIES <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>THE STATE <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, CAPE COAST]<o:p></o:p>[1967] GLR 551<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
10 AUGUST 1967<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

K. A. SARPONG FOR THE APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p>

AMUI, ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE
RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

ARCHER J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.<o:p></o:p>The
appellant was charged with the offence of stealing four pieces of wax print
valued at N¢76.80 the property of one Araba Kakraba. The appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charge but after hearing evidence, the trial magistrate at the
Cape Coast District Court Grade I found the appellant guilty and convicted him
and sentenced him to one day’s imprisonment and a fine of N¢180.00 or in
default nine months’ imprisonment with hard labour and ordered that N¢80.00
should be given to the complainant.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>When the
appeal came on for hearing, Mr. Sarpong, learned counsel for the appellant,
informed the court that the certified true copy of the proceedings supplied to
him indicated that the appellant was convicted of dishonestly receiving. After
reading the certified true copy of the record of proceedings supplied to the
court, I detected that the appellant was convicted of stealing, the original
offence with which the appellant was charged. Mr. Amui, the learned state
attorney, agreed that there was a conflict as to what the trial magistrate
found . . .<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The main
question I have to answer is what was pronounced in court? I think what
constitutes a judgment in summary trials is clearly provided in section 177 (1)
and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), as follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“(1) The
Court, having heard what each party has to say and the witnesses and evidence
so adduced, shall consider and determine the whole matter and may either
convict the accused and pass sentence upon or make an order against him
according to law or acquit him, as the case may be, and the Court shall give
its decision in the form of an oral judgment, and shall record the decision
briefly together with the reasons for it, where necessary . . . (3) The
conviction or order may, if required, be afterwards drawn up and shall be
signed by the Court making the conviction or order, or by the clerk or other
officer of the Court.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It
follows from the above subsections that the judgment should be orally delivered
in court and may afterwards be drawn up for signature by the court. In my view
it becomes obvious that only what is pronounced in court may afterwards be
drawn up. There is no licence to draw up an order substantially different from
the verdict pronounced in court. The prosecuting officer’s affidavit discloses
that the trial magistrate found the appellant guilty of dishonestly receiving.
The trial magistrate has been informed by the state attorney of what the
prosecuting officer heard and recorded on the police docket but the trial
magistrate has not, either by himself or by his court clerk, assisted this
court by denying the contents of the three affidavits before this court. I must
confess that I find the whole episode shrouded in mystery. The appellant has a
record of proceedings certified to be true and containing one verdict whereas
the appellate court has another record of proceedings also certified to be true
but containing a different verdict. It is impossible to say which was the
verdict pronounced orally in court.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Before I
take a decision in this appeal I wish to remark that it is not permissible for
a trial magistrate to pronounce one verdict orally in court to the hearing of
the public and later to re-write and alter the verdict in chambers after
discovering a flaw in the judgment. Once the verdict has been pronounced
orally, it is final and only an appellate court can alter it. Nevertheless in
the interest of justice and to save costs to be incurred by a convicted person
a trial magistrate who has second thoughts after delivering his verdict is at
liberty to report the second thoughts to a High Court judge to enable him to
exercise his revisionary powers under paragraph 58 of the Courts Decree, 1966
(N.L.C.D. 84).<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>