CONSOLIDATED AFRICAN SELECTION TRUST LTD vs. NKETIA [1971]DLCA2101

Date	1971-04-05
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1971]DLCA2101

APALOO

JIAGGE

SOWAH

QUASHIE-IDUN FOR THE APPELLANTS.

J. REINDORF FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1971]DLCA2101
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >CONSOLIDATED AFRICAN SELECTION TRUST LTD <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>NKETIA <o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1971] 1 GLR 363<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
5 APRIL 1971.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

QUASHIE-IDUN
FOR THE APPELLANTS.<o:p></o:p>

J.
REINDORF FOR THE RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

APALOO, JIAGGE AND SOWAH<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF APALOO J.A.<o:p></o:p>On 15
December 1957, the respondent was employed by the appellant company
(hereinafter called the company) as a surveyor at a monthly salary of £G85. The
appointment was in writing and contains the terms and conditions of service. It
is dated 2 April 1958, and was produced in evidence as exhibit B. The
appointment was for an indefinite period. Apparently, the earlier letter of
engagement was a temporary one because in March 1960 the company sent to the
respondent, another letter of engagement. It also sets out in slightly greater
detail the terms and conditions of his engagement (exhibit C.) The respondent
acknowledged these terms and expressed his concurrence to them as follows: “I
agree to the above terms and confirm that the above letter of engagement may be
deemed to have superseded the temporary letter of engagement dated 2nd&nbsp; April, 1959 and to have been effective as
from 1st&nbsp; March, 1960.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It seems
that the respondent’s services met with the company’s satisfaction because in
October 1962 he was promoted to what was described as the company’s supervisor
grade. He was again given a new letter of engagement and this contains as
usual, the terms and conditions of his employment (exhibit D). One striking
feature of all these letters of his engagement is that, each contains a clause
expressly conferring on the company a right to terminate the respondent’s appointment
and providing the length of notice that may be given prior to such termination.
The letter of engagement which was current at the date material to this case
(exhibit D), by paragraph (4) (a), provides as follows: “(4) (a) Your
engagement may be terminated at any time by one party giving to the other not
less than a month’s notice in writing.” This clause was amended to the
respondent’s advantage by a letter addressed to the latter from the company and
dated 29 January 1965 (exhibit 1). The relevant part of it reads:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“It has
now been decided that notwithstanding anything contained in your new letter of
engagement, you will be given a personal concession as a former member of the
company ‘A’ staff, and the clause covering notice by the company will remain as
previously. This is to say, the company may terminate your engagement by giving
three months’ notice in writing instead of the one month stipulated in
paragraph 4 (a) of your new letter of engagement.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>If
anything can be said to be clear in the contract under which the respondent was
employed, it is the provision regulating the reciprocal determination of the
engagement. The language used does not give rise to any problem of
interpretation. The current letter of engagement appears to have been sent to
the respondent under cover of the company’s letter of 25 September 1962
(exhibit E). In that letter, the company informed the respondent that the
Exchange Control Act, 1961 (Act 71), forbade it from remitting moneys to
service the provident fund and pension scheme to which the respondent was a
contributor. It therefore felt obliged to suspend the scheme. The company gave
other information about the scheme generally and said in paragraph (8) that:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">&nbsp;“Members of the regional staff are able to
look forward to a career with the company which, subject to satisfactory
service, should take them to normal retirement age. The company would like to
have a pension scheme in order that staff would have a pension when they
retire.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It is
this clause that lent some plausibility to the judgment appealed against. On 11
October 1965, the company, actin</main>