DATSA vs. THE REPUBLIC [1971]DLHC2105

Date	1971-01-29
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1971]DLHC2105

FRANCOIS J.

I. N. K. WUAKU FOR THE APPELLANT.

A. L. DJABATEY SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY (WITH HIM E. AKWEI-ADDO ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY)

FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1971]DLHC2105
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >DATSA<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;vs.<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;THE REPUBLIC <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, HO]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1971] 1 GLR 418<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
29 JANUARY 1971.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

I. N. K.
WUAKU FOR THE APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p>

A. L.
DJABATEY, SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY (WITH HIM E. AKWEI-ADDO,<o:p></o:p>

ASSISTANT
STATE ATTORNEY), FOR THE RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

FRANCOIS J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.<o:p></o:p>The
appellant was charged as follows: [his lordship here read the statement of
offence as set out in the headnote and continued:] It will be observed that
what passed for the statement of offence was in fact the particulars of the
offence. The offending section of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), was not
stated. Learned counsel for the Republic while admitting this irregularity
urged that it was not fatal since it could be cured by the general proviso
contained in section 330 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), as
amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 261), s. 7. I
do not accept this argument. The law enjoins on the prosecutor to be precise as
to the charge so that an accused person is aware of what he or she is to answer.
The particulars as they stood despite the use of the word “steal” could apply
to a host of other crimes.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In R. v.
Woods [1968] 3 W.L.R. 1192 at p. 1195, C.A., Phillimore L.J. reading the
judgment of the English Court of Appeal which I cite with respectful approval,
said:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“It is of
the first importance that a man charged with an offence should know with
certainty what it is he may be convicted of. No court should be encouraged to
cast around to see whether somehow or other the words of the indictment can be
found to contain by some arguable implication the seeds of some other offence.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Thus in
the long and informative judgment of Adumua-Bossman J.S.C. in Dadzie v.
Commissioner of Police [1963] 1 G.L.R. 244 at p. 263, S.C. there is this
passage, “the essential elements of the offence,... should be communicated to
an accused person in order that he might know of what he is accused.” Lord
Mansfield C.J. in R. v. Aylett (1785) 1 T.R. 63 at p. 69 stated that “It is
necessary in every crime that the indictment charge it with certainty and
precision to be understood by everybody: alleging all the requisites which
constitute the offence.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In my
view no specific offence was charged in this case and therefore this court has
no jurisdiction to convict of any offence. See Commissioner of Police v.
Wenyonu (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 459, C.A. Learned counsel for the appellant urged
that the facts did not support a case of stealing even if it were held a proper
charge had been laid. He urged that since the prosecution conceded that the
appellant’s accounts had been checked at the close of the working day on
Saturday, 7 June 1969, and no loss had been detected, without proof that she
physically removed the money on the following Monday, 9 June, when her accounts
were audited, no criminal liability should attach to her. To this learned
counsel for the Republic retorted with the case of Aboah v. The Queen (1953) 14
W.A.C.A. 252.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>I think
however the application of this case is misconceived. The principle in the
Aboah case presupposes an acceptance by the accused of the money,
subject-matter of the charge, being originally in his possession and a
subsequent failure t</main>