BANK OF GHANA vs. LABONE WEAVERS ENTERPRISES LTD. [1971]DLSC2091

Date	1971-02-22
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1971]DLSC2091

AZU CRABBE JA

JIAGGE JA

ARCHER J.A.

E. N. MOORE (BUTA WITH HIM) FOR THE APPLICANTS.

I. AMOO-LAMPTEY (QUIST WITH HIM) FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

[1971]DLSC2091
																																						<div class="restriction-wrapper">
														<div class="container-lg">
															<div class="row">
																<div class="col-md-12 restricted-content">
																	<div class="restricted-content-img-wrapper">
																		<div class="lock-icon bounce-7">
																			<img class=""
																				src="https://www.dennislawgh.com/dl-assets/dl-images/lock-content.png"
																				alt="Subscription based content">
																		</div>
																	</div>
																	 
																		<a href="https://www.dennislawgh.com/login"
																		class="btn btn-primary btn-lg"
																		style="font-family: 'open sans'; text-transform: capitalize; border-radius: 8px"> 
																		Login to Read Full Case </a>
																	 
																	
																</div>
															</div>
														</div>
													</div>
													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >BANK OF GHANA <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>LABONE WEAVERS ENTERPRISES LTD. <o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1971] 1 GLR 251<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
22 FEBRUARY 1971.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

E. N.
MOORE (BUTA WITH HIM) FOR THE APPLICANTS.<o:p></o:p>

I. AMOO-LAMPTEY
(QUIST WITH HIM) FOR THE RESPONDENTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

AZU CRABBE, JIAGGE AND ARCHER JJ.A.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF AZU CRABBE J.A.<o:p></o:p>Azu
Crabbe J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. This is an application by the
plaintiffs-applicants for an order for special leave to appeal to this court
against the unreported ruling of Hayfron-Benjamin J. given on 23 November 1970,
in the High Court, Accra. The circumstances leading to this application are
briefly these: On 5 October 1970, the applicants filed a specially endorsed
writ, accompanied by a statement of claim, against the respondents claiming the
sum of N¢136,473.62 plus interest of ten per cent. per annum. The respondents
entered an appearance but failed to file a defence, and on 13 October 1970, the
applicants filed a summons for liberty to enter final judgment against the
respondents under Order 14, r. 1 of the Supreme [High] Court (Civil Procedure)
Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). Before the hearing of the summons, however, the
respondents filed their statement of defence and counterclaim on 16 October
1970. On 20 October 1970, the respondents filed an affidavit in opposition to
the applicants’ summons. The summons first came before Abban J. but eventually
it was heard by Hayfron-Benjamin J. who, on 23 November 1970, granted the
respondents unconditional leave to defend the applicants’ claim. On 27 November
1970, the applicants filed an application in the High Court for an order for
special leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against Hayfron-Benjamin J.’s
ruling of 23 November 1970. On 7 December 1970, Hayfron-Benjamin J. dismissed
the application, and in his ruling he said.:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">&nbsp;“The rule for summary judgment under Order 14,
r. 1 is a hard one (see Ludford v. Rymull, 4 T.L.R. 693) and to appeal against
an order granting unconditional leave, the application must show clearly that
there is no defence to the claim whatsoever, and that in granting unconditional
leave to defend there was a serious breach of some fundamental principle of law
of some importance. This application for special leave contains nothing but
tendencious statements and ridiculous and baseless charges against the trial
judge. No breach of any principle of law or justice is alleged, and I for
myself have no hesitation in dismissing it with costs assessed at N¢50.00.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
present application for special leave is a repetition of the application in the
High Court before Hayfron-Benjamin J. and it has obviously been brought under
rule 28 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218). Rule 28 provides as
follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“Subject
to the provisions of these Rules and to any other enactment, where under any
enactment an application may be made either to the Court below or to the Court
it shall be made in the first instance to the Court below, but if the Court
below refuses to grant the application, the applicant shall be entitled to have
the application determined by the Court.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>As we
said in Tormekpey v. Ahiable, Court of Appeal, 27 January 1970, unreported;
digested in (1970) C.C. 44:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“An
application under rule 28 is therefore a fresh application, and the Court of
Appeal, in deciding whether or not to grant it, exercises its own discretion in
the matter, after assessing the facts and circumstances independently. The
court does not sit primarily to review the exercise of a discretion by the
court below.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>