GUARDIAN ASSURANCE CO., LTD. vs. KHAYAT TRADING STORE [1972]DLCA2223

Date	1972-03-20
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1972]DLCA2223

AZU CRABBE J.S.C.

AMISSAH JA

ARCHER J.A.

JAMES QUASHIE-IDUN FOR THE APPELLANTS.

I. AMOO-LAMPTEY (WITH HIM C. E. QUIST) FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

[1972]DLCA2223
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >GUARDIAN ASSURANCE CO., LTD. <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>KHAYAT TRADING STORE <o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1972] 2 GLR 48<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

DATE:
20 MARCH 1972.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

JAMES QUASHIE-IDUN FOR THE APPELLANTS.<o:p></o:p>

I. AMOO-LAMPTEY (WITH HIM C. E. QUIST) FOR THE
RESPONDENTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

AZU CRABBE J.S.C., AMISSAH AND ARCHER
JJ.A.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF AMISSAH J.A.<o:p></o:p>This is
an appeal from a judgment of Anterkyi J. which awarded Messrs. Khayat Trading
Store (hereafter described as the respondents) the sum of ¢18,000 plus costs of
¢1,800 on their claim for the loss of goods from their store through theft. The
thieves apparently broke into that store on 21 September 1967, and removed
therefrom a quantity of textiles and other goods including the furniture in it.
Two days earlier, that is on 19 September 1967, the respondents had insured the
goods in the store with Messrs. Guardian Assurance Co., Ltd., the appellants,
for N¢20,000. The appellants’ liability, if any, therefore arises from the
insurance policy.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>By a
letter dated 26 September 1967, the appellants wrote to the respondents telling
them that the policy was void because the respondents had made material
misrepresentations in the proposals for the insurance cover, and at the trial
the appellants resisted the claim on this ground. The trial judge, however,
found against them and awarded the amounts mentioned earlier to the
respondents.<o:p></o:p>The
appellants now appeal to us against this judgment on the following grounds:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“(1) The
judgment cannot be supported having regard to the evidence led at the trial.<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">&nbsp;(2) The learned trial judge failed to give any
or any adequate consideration to facts relied upon by the defendants in their
defence and admitted by the plaintiffs under cross-examination. <o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(3) The
learned trial judge was wrong in law in holding that the plaintiffs had proved
their loss. <o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(4) The
costs awarded are unreasonable and excessive.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Grounds
(1) and (2) were taken together in the argument of the appeal. The complaint
therein was in respect of the appellants’ allegation that the respondents had
misrepre- sented material facts in the proposal form which entitled them, that
is the appellants, to avoid the policy. At the trial, the learned judge had
taken the view that there had been no misrepresentation. He believed the
respondents’ principal witness, a partner in the firm, who had said that he
made a full and frank disclosure on the questions asked on the proposal form to
the appellants’ agent, one Zwennes, and that it was Zwennes who wrote or caused
the answers to be written down. Any misrepresentation therefore was the
handiwork not of the respondents but of the appellants’ agent for whom the
appellants should be held fully responsible. In attacking the trial judge’s
conclusion, the appellants argued that he failed to take into account the
inconsistency between the respondents’ pleadings and the evidence led in proof
of their case and that if the judge had done so, he would have regarded the
respondents’ evidence as an afterthought and rejected it.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>T</main>