F. E. GHASSOUB (GHANA) LTD. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX [1972]DLHC2218

Date	1972-06-25
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1972]DLHC2218

MENSA BOISON J.

C. F. HAYFRON-BENJAMIN FOR THE APPLICANT.

W. O. GYAMPOH FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1972]DLHC2218
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >F. E. GHASSOUB (GHANA) LTD. <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT,
KUMASI]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1972] 2 GLR 395<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

DATE:
25 JULY 1972.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

C. F. HAYFRON-BENJAMIN FOR THE APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p>

W. O. GYAMPOH FOR THE RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

MENSA BOISON J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.<o:p></o:p>This is
an application on behalf of the defendants to set aside a summary judgment
obtained against them in default under Order 14, r. 1 of the Supreme [High]
Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). By a specially endorsed writ
filed on 7 March 1969 the plaintiff claimed against the defendants a total of
¢77,763.38 being tax and penalty for the years 1965-66, 1966-67, 1967-68 and
tax only for 1968-69. On 16 November 1970 the defendants successfully resisted
a motion for summary judgment under Order 14, r. 1 of the Supreme [High] Court
(Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), and were accordingly granted leave
to defend the action. No defence was, however, filed by the defendants when on
18 February 1971 the plaintiff gave notice to discontinue the action “with
liberty to bring a fresh action.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>A fresh
action was in fact filed 18 February 1971 this time claiming by the specially
endorsed writ the income tax and penalty for 1969-70 and 1970-71 and employees’
tax deductions from June 1966 to September 1970, in addition. The total claim
now was ¢102,622.70. Appearance was entered on behalf of the defendants but no
defence was filed and judgment was entered on 11 October 1971 under Order 14,
r. 1 in default.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
present application is to have that judgment set aside. The ground taken is
that the plaintiff having given notice to discontinue the former action without
leave could not institute the fresh action without leave. The law as regards a
plaintiff’s right to discontinue an action is provided under Order 26, r. 1;
and as far as relevant to the facts of the discontinuance in this case it is as
follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“The
plaintiff may, at any time before receipt of the defendant’s defence, or after
the receipt thereof before taking any other proceeding in the action (save any
interlocutory application), by notice in writing, wholly discontinue his action
against all or any of the defendants or withdraw any part or parts of his alleged
cause of complaint . . . and such discontinuance or withdrawal, as the case may
be, shall not be a defence to any subsequent action. Save as in this rule
otherwise provided, it shall not be competent for the plaintiff to withdraw the
record or discontinue the action without leave of the Court or a Judge . . .”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>I think
the meaning is plain and it does not require any gloss to interpret the rule.
When on 18 February 1971 the plaintiff discontinued his former action no
defence had been filed, and after the discontinuance the plaintiff was entitled
to institute the second action for the same relief as in the first action, and,
more so, for the reliefs not covered by the first action.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The case
of Amoako Atta II v. Osei Kofi II (No. 2) [1962] 1 G.L.R. 384 relied on by Mr.
Pobee, learned counsel for the defendants, as supporting his contention is, in
my respectful view not in point. The facts there do not show that the suit was
discontinued without leave, nor exactly at what stage the earlier action was
stayed, or, as contended, discontinued. In that sense, that statement of the
law was obiter.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>