OKYERE AND ANOTHER vs. THE REPUBLIC [1972]DLHC2401

Date	1972-11-17
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1972]DLHC2401

HAYFRON-BENJAMIN J.

ADAMAFIO FOR THE APPLICANTS.

G. K. AVAH FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

[1972]DLHC2401
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >OKYERE AND ANOTHER<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;vs. <o:p></o:p>THE REPUBLIC <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT,
ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1972]
1 GLR 99<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

DATE:
17 NOVEMBER 1971.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

ADAMAFIO FOR THE APPLICANTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

HAYFRON-BENJAMIN J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF HAYFRON-BENJAMIN J.<o:p></o:p>This is
an application by the second and third accused persons for bail pending appeal.
The second accused applicant was charged on one count of conspiracy to steal,
two counts of pretending to be a public officer, and one count of stealing. The
third accused applicant was charged on one count of conspiracy to steal, one
count of aiding and abetting stealing, and two counts of aiding and abetting
extortion. The accused persons were found guilty and convicted on all counts.
The second accused applicant was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with
hard labour on each count and the third accused was sentenced to eighteen
months’ imprisonment with hard labour on each count. All the sentences were to
run concurrently. The judgment was delivered on 27 August 1971 , i.e. over two
months ago. On 25 October 1971, the applicants applied for bail before this
court. I dismissed their application but directed the registry to expedite the
preparation of the record of proceedings to enable the appeal to be heard at an
early date. I did so because on the perusal of the lengthy judgment of the
learned trial circuit court judge, it appeared to me that some fundamental
constitutional rights of the accused persons might have been infringed during the
trial, and it would be desirable to hear the appeal quickly to determine
whether this view was well founded or not. Unfortunately the registry has not
been able, due undoubtedly to pressure of work, even to start the preparation
of the record of proceedings. The applicants have therefore brought a fresh
application.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The Court of Appeal in 1967 laid down the principles guiding
the court in the exercise of its discretion to grant bail. Ollennu J.A. (as he
then was) reading the unanimous ruling of the court in the case of State v.
Owusu, Court of Appeal, 22 June 1967, unreported; digested in (1967) C.C. 111,
said very clear principles are laid down as to the circumstances in which alone
the court may exercise its discretion to grant bail after conviction. These
principles have been summarised in R. v. Tunwashe (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 236 as
follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“(1) That
bail will not be granted pending an appeal save in exceptional circumstances or
where the hearing of the appeal is likely to be unduly delayed. (2) That in
dealing with the latter class of case the Court will have regard not only to
the length of time which must elapse before the appeal can be heard but also to
the length of the sentence to be appealed from, and further that these two
matters will be considered in relation to one another.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>To these
may be added a third, namely, where the court is satisfied that the conviction
is prima facie erroneous either in law or in fact, and that there will be
apparent miscarriage of justice if bail is refused. The Court of Appeal in
State v. Halm, 27 July 1967, unreported, applied the ruling in State v. Owusu
(supra). Akufo-Addo C.J. (as he then was) said:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“The
principles upon which an appellate court in this country will act on an
application for bail pending appeal are clearly set out in the judgment of this
court dated 22 June 1967 in the case of State v. Owusu. The grant of bail to a
convicted prisoner pending the hearing of his appeal is an unusual course which
may be adopted only in exceptional circumstances. Such exceptional
circumstances may be that (1) the conviction is prima facie wrong and the
appeal therefore has obvious prospects of success. Coupled with that is: (2)
the probability that having regard to the shortness of the sentence imposed the
hearing of the appeal may be unduly delayed. Another such exceptional
circumstance may be the absolute necessity for the appellant to be free to help
his advisers in the preparation of the appeal.”<o:p></o:p>