SFARIJLANI vs. BASIL [1973]DLCA2205

Date	1973-05-28
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1973]DLCA2205

AZU CRABBE C.J

LASSEY JA

ARCHER J.A.

ALHAJI B. KWAW SWANZY FOR THE APPELLANT.

NARH FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1973]DLCA2205
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >SFARIJLANI <o:p></o:p>vs.<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;BASIL <o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL,
ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1973]
2 GLR 260<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

DATE:
28 MAY 1973.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

ALHAJI B. KWAW SWANZY FOR THE APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

AZU CRABBE C.J., LASSEY AND ARCHER
JJ.A.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.A.<o:p></o:p>In 1954,
the respondent as landlord granted a lease of a shop in a house known as No.
D974/3 Knutsford Avenue, Accra, for a period of ten years. After various
assignments, the appellant became the assignee of the residue of the term in
September 1962. When the residue expired, the appellant continued to occupy the
premises as a statutory tenant by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Act,
1963 (Act 220), until March 1967, when the respondent through his solicitor
gave the appellant one month’s notice to determine the statutory tenancy on the
ground that the respondent required the shop for his own business purposes. The
respondent at the same time gave the appellant the six months’ statutory notice
laid down by the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), of his intention to apply to the
court for an order for the recovery of possession if the appellant did not
deliver up possession.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
appellant refused to quit and accordingly the respondent applied to the district
court at Accra for an order for delivery of possession. The learned district
magistrate after taking evidence and hearing legal submissions made on behalf
of the parties, gave judgment for the respondent. The appellant then appealed
to the High Court at Accra which also upheld the judgment of the trial court.
Still not satisfied, the appellant appealed to this court. Various grounds of
appeal were filed and argued but the main legal point was whether the
respondent fulfilled all the statutory conditions required of a landlord who
reasonably requires premises for his own business purposes.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Section
17 (1) (h) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), relied on by the respondent
provides as follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“17. (1)
Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 25 and of section 28, no
order against a tenant for the recovery of the possession of, or for the
ejectment from, any premises shall be made or given by the appropriate Rent
Magistrate, or any other Judge of a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance
with the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force, except
in any of the following circumstances:-...<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(h) where
the lease has expired and the premises are reasonably required by the landlord
to be used by him for his own business purposes, such premises being
constructed to be used as such, if the landlord has given not less than six
months’ written notice to the tenant of his intention to apply for an order for
the recovery of the possession of, or the ejectment from, the premises.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
evidence on record clearly shows that the residue of the lease held by the
appellant had expired but he had continued to remain in possession as a
statutory tenant. Accordingly, the respondent gave notice terminating the
statutory tenancy and at the same time gave six months’ notice of his intention
to sue for recovery of possession. Furthermore, there was evidence that the
respondent was the proprietor of a perfume factory and had indicated his
intention to use the shop in question for the wholesale, display and retail of
his perfumes. Nevertheless, learned counsel for the appellant vigorously
stressed before this court that there was no evidence that the shop in question
had been constructed to be used as a suitable place for the respondent’s
business. The argument, therefore, continued that this statutory requirement
was not fulfilled by the respondent. There is no doubt that this requirement is
an essential statutory condition but it seems that the evidence on record
affords a complete answer to the argument by learned counsel for the appellant.
The premises in question have always been used as a shop since the appellant
took over the residue of the lease in 1962. It follows, therefore, that the
premises </main>