LYNES QUASHIE-IDUN vs. GBEDEMAH [1973]DLHC2400

Date	1973-12-12
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1973]DLHC2400

ABBAN J.

JOE REINDORF (WITH HIM R. I. QUANSAH) FOR THE PLAINTIFFS.

S. A. OKUDZETO FOR THE DEFENDANT.

[1973]DLHC2400
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >LYNES QUASHIE-IDUN<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;vs. <o:p></o:p>GBEDEMAH <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT,
ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1973]
1 GLR 191<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

DATE:
12 DECEMBER 1972.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

JOE REINDORF (WITH HIM R. I. QUANSAH) FOR THE
PLAINTIFFS.<o:p></o:p>

S. A. OKUDZETO FOR THE DEFENDANT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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ABBAN J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.<o:p></o:p>The
plaintiffs are solicitors and, by their specially endorsed writ, they are
claiming from the defendant the outstanding balance of their professional
charges for acting for the defendant in certain court cases and in appearing
for him at the Jiagge Assets Commission.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
amount the plaintiffs are claiming is ¢18,066.50. The defendant even though he
does not deny that the plaintiffs are entitled to some fees, disputes the
amount of the bill and contends that the bill should be referred to a taxing
officer for taxation by virtue of the Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act 32).<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In the
present application, learned counsel for the plaintiffs has asked for summary
judgment to be entered against the defendant under Order 14, r. 1 of the
Supreme [High] Court (Civil procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), and has also
opposed any reference to the taxing officer. Counsel submitted that the
defendant’s conduct in not applying to the court within one month of the
delivery of the bills was an indication that he had agreed to those charges;
and he is therefore estopped from applying for reference to the taxing officer.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>As a
matter of fact, one of the defendant’s letters written to the plaintiffs, and
dated 16 August 1971, shows that the defendant accepted the charges more than
twelve months ago but pleaded for time to pay. In view of this, learned counsel
further submitted that the provisions of section 31 of Act 32 cannot apply and
the court should not, at this stage, refer the bill to any taxing officer, but
judgment should be entered for the amount endorsed on the writ.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
submissions of the plaintiffs’ counsel appear to be well-founded, so far as the
interpretation of section 31 of the said Act is concerned. However, learned
counsel for the defendant argued that although it is true that twelve months
have elapsed since the last of the three bills involved was delivered to the
defendant, the court still has general jurisdiction to refer the matter to the
taxing officer. Counsel contended that comparison of the bill dated 28 June
1969 and the one dated 18 November 1969, attached to the defendant’s affidavit,
shows that the plaintiffs are claiming twice for the services they rendered in
respect of proceedings before the Jiagge Assets Commission.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It is
also plain, counsel submitted, that the plaintiffs are charging fees for an
action which they brought in the High Court to set aside the Jiagge Assets
Commission’s report, and which action the plaintiffs had to withdraw, because
they did not give one month’s statutory notice to the Attorney-General before
issuing the said writ. Counsel argued that this was a mistake on the part of
the plaintiffs who, as solicitors, were supposed to know the law with regard to
the issuing of writs against the Republic. Learned counsel therefore submitted
that it is not fair, in these circumstances, to allow the plaintiffs to charge
fees for their own mistake.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>