MONTA vs. PATERSON SIMONS (GHANA) LTD. [1974]DLHC2297

Date	1974-07-24
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1974]DLHC2297

MENSA BOISON J.

BROBBEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

ASIEDU FOR THE DEFENDANTS.

[1974]DLHC2297
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:
115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:Times;
mso-bidi-font-family:Times;color:#548DD4;mso-themecolor:text2;mso-themetint:
153">MONTA <o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:
115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:Times;
mso-bidi-font-family:Times;color:#548DD4;mso-themecolor:text2;mso-themetint:
153">vs. <o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:
115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:Times;
mso-bidi-font-family:Times;color:#548DD4;mso-themecolor:text2;mso-themetint:
153">PATERSON SIMONS (GHANA) LTD.<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[HIGH COURT, KUMASI]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1974] 2 GLR 162<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
24 JULY 1974.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

BROBBEY
FOR THE PLAINTIFF.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

MENSA BOISON J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF MENSA-BOION J.<o:p></o:p>By a deed
dated 14 December 1960, the plaintiff, referred to as the sub-lessor, leased
certain premises to the defendants for a term of fifteen years commencing from
1 December 1960; so however that the defendants had the option to determine the
lease at the expiration of the first ten years. That was provided by clause 4
(b) as follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“(b) If
the company [i.e. the defendants] desire to determine the present demise at the
expiration of the first ten (10) years of the said term and shall give to the
sub-lessor not less than six (6) calendar months written notice of such desire
and shall up to the time of such determination pay the rent and perform and
observe the covenants on its part hereinbefore contained shall immediately on
the expiration of such notice the present demise and everything herein
contained shall cease and be void but without prejudice to the remedies of
either party against the other . . .”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>By a
letter dated 14 May 1970, and exhibited as exhibit B, the defendants signified
their desire to determine the lease and notified the plaintiff formally saying
that, “we shall exercise our right to determine the present lease from 1
December 1970.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
plaintiff’s contention is that this is not good notice under clause 4 (b) of
the deed and instituted this action by originating summons for a decision. The
plaintiff’s stand is that the proviso imposes a term of ten years certain,
after which the option to determine may be exercised; that is to say, the
notice of six calendar months or more could only be given to take effect at the
earliest six months after 1 December 1970.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
defendants maintained the contrary. Their stand is a notice given six months
before 1 December 1970, such that it terminates the lease on 1 December, is
good as “determining the demise at the expiration of the first ten years of the
term.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It is a
rule of construction that where legal terms or words of well-known legal import
are used by lawyers, especially by conveyancers, they will have their technical
legal import: see Odgers’ Construction of Deeds and Statutes (5th ed.) at p.
51. And in Re Sassoon; sub nom. Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Raphael [1935]
A.C. 96 at p. 145, H.L., Lord Wright was of the opinion that this rule applies
even if by a mistake of the draftsman there is a manifest failure to fulfil the
intention of the testator.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In this
instant case learned counsel have referred to several authorities as
precedents. The principle I gather, however, on the one hand is that where the
lease is determinable “on or after” a specified date, then the stipulated
period of notice, to be legal, is calculated after the expiration of the period
certain</main>