SAFO-ADU vs. BOAMPONG [1974]DLHC2329

Date	1974-06-17
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1974]DLHC2329

MENSA BOISON J

MMIEH FOR THE APPLICANT.

OBENG FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1974]DLHC2329
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:
115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:Times;
mso-bidi-font-family:Times;color:#548DD4;mso-themecolor:text2;mso-themetint:
153">SAFO-ADU<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:
115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:Times;
mso-bidi-font-family:Times;color:#548DD4;mso-themecolor:text2;mso-themetint:
153">&nbsp;vs. <o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:
115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:Times;
mso-bidi-font-family:Times;color:#548DD4;mso-themecolor:text2;mso-themetint:
153">BOAMPONG<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[HIGH COURT, KUMASI]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[1974] 2 GLR 107<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
17 JUNE 1974.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

MMIEH FOR
THE APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

MENSA BOISON J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.<o:p></o:p>This is a
motion to set aside the judgment of this court dated 31 October 1973 in default
of appearance at the trial.<o:p></o:p>The
original action was a claim principally for arrears of rent and damages for
disrepair under a tenancy agreement, the defendant (hereinafter called the
applicant) having leased a building of the plaintiff ‘s (hereinafter called the
respondent) for the purpose of his practice as a medical practitioner. Early in
1969, however, the applicant appeared to have made a bid for a political
career. At the general elections of 1969 he was successfully elected a member
of the Parliament of the Second Republic of Ghana, and indeed secured a seat as
a cabinet minister in the erstwhile Government of the Progress Party. That must
have decided the fate of the tenancy agreement. The applicant gave notice
determining the lease with effect from 11 May 1969. It was as a result of a
dispute arising out of this determination that the respondent had to issue his
writ dated 26 February 1970, against the defendant, then a full-fledged cabinet
minister of the Ghana Government on the African scene.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
relevant period material to the present application was from 28 February 1973
to 16 July 1973. That was the time when after a tortuous career the action at
long last ripened for hearing. By that time, however, the applicant’s political
fortunes had altered. The Progress Party Government had been removed from
office by a military coup d’etat on 13 January 1972; and the applicant and others,
commonly styled politicians, were in preventive custody. On the affidavits in
this application I accept that the applicant’s period of detention was from 13
January 1972 to 3 July 1973.<o:p></o:p>The rule
under which the application is brought is Order 36, r. 18 of the Supreme [High]
Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), which states:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“Any
verdict or judgment obtained where one party does not appear at the trial may
be set aside by the Court or a Judge upon such terms as may seem fit, upon an
application made within fourteen days after the trial.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The rule
does not appear to impose any limitation on the discretion of the court or on
the matters that the court may consider in exercising its discretion to set
aside such a judgment. That was the judgment of the House of Lords in the case
of Evans v. Bartlam [1937] 2 All E.R. 646, when considering a similar
application in default of appearance under the corresponding English rules,
i.e. Order 13, r. 10 and Order 27, r. 15.<o:p></o:p>In my
opinion the spirit of Order 36, r. 18 is the same and the jurisdiction is not
to be fettered. But in Evans v. Bartlam (supra) it was nevertheless stated by
Lord Russell of Killowen at p. 651 that:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“The
contention no doubt contains this element of truth, that, from the nature of
the case, no judge could, in exercising the discretion conferred on him by the
rule, fail to consider both (a) whether any useful purpose could be served by
setting aside the judgment, and obviously no useful purpose would be served if
there were no possible defence to the action; and (b) how it came about that
the applicant found himself bound by a judgment, regularly obtained, to which
he could have set up some serious defence. But to say that these two mat</main>