REPUBLIC vs. COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (R. T. BRISCOE (GHANA) LTD.); EX PARTE R. T. BRISCOE (GHANA) LTD. [1975]DLCA429

REPUBLIC vs. COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (R. T. BRISCOE (GHANA) LTD.); EX PARTE R. T.... [1975]DLCA429

Date	1975-12-16
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1975]DLCA429

ANIN J.A

KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.A

HAYFRON-BENJAMIN J.A.

JOE REINDORF (WITH HIM JAMES QUASHIE-IDUN) FOR THE APPLICANTS.

D. K. AFREH CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1975]DLCA429
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >REPUBLIC <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (R. T. BRISCOE (GHANA)<o:p></o:p>LTD.); EX PARTE R. T. BRISCOE (GHANA) LTD.<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[COURT
OF APPEAL, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1976] 1 GLR 166<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

DATE:
16 DECEMBER 1975.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

JOE REINDORF (WITH HIM JAMES QUASHIE-IDUN) FOR THE
APPLICANTS.<o:p></o:p>

D. K. AFREH, CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE
RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

ANIN, KINGSLEY-NYINAH AND HAYFRON-BENJAMIN
JJ.A.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.<o:p></o:p>ANIN J.A.
delivered the ruling of the court. This is an application by the applicant
company for the grant of an order staying proceedings of the respondent
committee pending the hearing and determination of the appeal hererin filed on
5 December 1975.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In
support of the application Mr. Reindorf, learned counsel, relied on the
affidavit sworn in support of the application by one Mr. Ole Erichsen, the
applicant company’s director and executive, sworn to and filed on 5 December
1975, together with the accompanying exhibits. He has urged before us that
unless the proceedings “actively going on” before the respondent committee are
stayed, the applicant company will be prejudiced and the committee would have
accomplished what they are now being sought to be restrained from doing. He
however conceded that, if their substantive appeal should succeed, an order of
prohibition will be issued on the one hand restraining the committee from
further acting in the matter, and on the other hand, an order of certiorari
will lie from this court quashing the committee’s proceedings and report. He
invited us to consider seriously the arguments advanced in his client’s
affidavit that unless a stay is granted in the terms prayed, a successful
outcome of the appeal would be a hollow victory and futile in practice; and
that on the balance of convenience, a delay in the respondent committee’s
proceedings would not cause the Republic insurmountable inconvenience or
irreparable damage. On the contrary, he submitted that the balance of
convenience weighed heavily in his client’s favour. Consequently, he invited us
to grant the application as prayed.<o:p></o:p>For the
respondent committee Mr. Afreh, learned chief state attorney, relied on an
affidavit in opposition deposed to by Mr. Anson of the office of the
Attorney-General and filed on 12 December 1975 wherein it is stated that this
court is precluded in the circumstances of this suit by the State Proceedings
Act, 1961 (Act 51), s. 13 (2) from issuing the order of stay of proceedings
prayed for. In addition Mr. Afreh contended that rule 27 of the Court of Appeal
Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules,
1969 (L.I. 618), and as further amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment)
Rules, 1975 (L.I. 1002), is inapplicable to the facts of this case since the
proceedings contemplated therein which may be stayed refer to judgments and
decisions of a court against which execution can be levied under Orders 42 to
48 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), being rules
dealing with the recovery of land, property, or for attachment of stocks and
shares, etc. He however conceded after further reflection that this court has
jurisdiction to order a stay of execution in appropriate cases where special
circumstances warrant it.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>We have
given a careful, anxious and sympathetic consideration to the many interesting
points raised by the affidavits on both sides and by learned counsel for and
against the application. We are satisfied that this court has inherent
jurisdiction to hear the present application for stay on the facts of this
case. In doing so, we must not be deemed to be sitting on appeal from the
refusal of Annan J.A. to grant the oral application for stay in the court
below; but we exercised a fresh jurisdiction: see the first holding in the
headnote to Joseph v. Jebeille [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387, S.C. which held in similar
circumstances that an application for stay to the appellate court after a
refusal in the court below is a fresh application.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>However,
our discretion to grant stay of proceedings pending the hearing of the appeal
in the instant case will only be exercised if there are special circumstances
warranting it’. The mere allegation that there had been a misdirection or a
series of misdirections is, on the authorities, not deemed to be such a
“special circumstance”: see Monk v. Bartram [1891] 1 Q.B. 346, C.A. No doubt
those alleged errors will be fully canvassed when the merits of the appeal are
gone into at th</main>