ATINGA MOSHIE ALIAS ADAMA vs. THE REPUBLIC [1976]DLCA1239

Date	1976-07-28
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1976]DLCA1239

ARCHER JA

KINGSLEY-NYINAH JA

HAYFRON-BENJAMIN J.A.

T. K. OFORI FOR THE APPELLANT.

MRS. J. BAMFORD-ADDO PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1976]DLCA1239
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >ATINGA MOSHIE ALIAS ADAMA <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>THE REPUBLIC <o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1977] 1 GLR 186<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
28 JULY 1976<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

T. K. OFORI FOR THE APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p>

MRS. J. BAMFORD-ADDO, PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY,
FOR THE RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

ARCHER, KINGSLEY-NYINAH AND<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.A.<o:p></o:p>Archer
J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant was employed as a farm
labourer in Babianiha, near Dormaa-Ahenkro, in the Brong-Ahafo Region and he
lived in the same house as his employer. One evening in April 1969, after
helping his employer and his family in shelling groundnuts, the appellant
retired to his room. Shortly afterward two women who had brought the groundnuts
decided to return to their own houses. All of a sudden there was some sound as
if someone had fallen down. The employer, Nuhu Moshie, then got up to see what
had happened. Nuhu Moshie saw the appellant standing in front of his room
holding a cutlass. The appellant then attempted to strike his employer with the
cutlass, but the latter managed to grab the appellant and both fell down.
However, the appellant succeeded in slashing the left wrist of his employer
who, realising that the appellant might kill him, escaped from the house but
unfortunately he did not get very far when he collapsed. When the employer’s
wife, Yaa Manua, started shouting for help, the appellant attacked her with the
cutlass and inflicted wounds on her. She ran naked to the nearest police
station to report. Later the appellant also called at the police station to
report that he had killed Kofi Amadu aged about three years and the old man.
Upon hearing this, Yaa Manua collapsed at the station. Both she and her husband
regained consciousness at the Dormaa-Ahenkro Hospital. After the police had
conducted on the spot investigations, it became known that the appellant had
killed three persons and had injured several others in the village when he went
berserk in the village slashing any one he came across. Consequently, the
appellant was charged with the murder of one of the victims, Kofi Amadu, the
three-year-old grandson of Nuhu Moshie and Yaa Manua. The defence relied on by
learned counsel for the appellant at the trial was insanity. The jury rejected
this plea and found the appellant guilty of murder.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The only
ground of appeal argued before this court was that the learned trial judge in
his summing-up misdirected the jury when he directed them to consider the state
of mind of the appellant soon after the killing, that is, when he reported the
incident to the police. Learned counsel for the Republic conceded that there
was a misdirection in the summing-up and pointed out that the issue of insanity
must be related to the time of killing and not to the period after the killing.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
following paragraph from the summing-up is pertinent:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“If you
accept the evidence of the first prosecution witness that the accused reported
the killing then you may perhaps like to consider whether the accused at the
time he came to report was sane or insane. If you find that he was sane then
you will have to consider why he was later found to be behaving abnormally and
talking nonsense. You will note that the accused was in the hospital because of
the severe beating he said he sustained. Was he behaving abnormally and talking
nonsense because of his pains or was it because he was insane? Or was it
because the full impact of his conduct might have been brought home when he
found himself in the hospital with the many persons he had injured? All these
matters are to engage your serious attention in deciding whether the abnormal
behaviour and his talking ‘nonsense’ bear any relevance to the question of his
insanity. You will note that there was no question as to the accused behaving
abnormally on talking incoherently when he gave his statement nine days after
the incident on 23 April 1969. I will refer you to the dialogue (questions and
answers) between the assistant state attorney and the accused if it may perhaps
assist you in deciding the state of mind of the accused soon after the act,
i.e. at the time he came to the police station.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>There is
no doubt that the jury were misled into thinking that what mattered in
determining the sanity or insanity of the appellant was his conduct after the
killing. This misdirection was so serious as to deprive the jury of the
opportunity of considering the relevant evidence which should assist them in
considering the appellant’s defence of insanity.<o:p></o:p>