BADU ALIAS BUKARI vs. THE REPUBLIC [1976]DLCA1247

Date	1976-07-28
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1976]DLCA1247

ANIN JA

HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JA

FRANCOIS J.A.

APPELLANT IN PERSON.

MRS. J. BAMFORD-ADDO PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE REPUBLIC.

[1976]DLCA1247
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >BADU ALIAS BUKARI <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>THE REPUBLIC <o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1989-90]1 GLR 199<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
28 JULY 1976<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

APPELLANT IN PERSON.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

ANIN, HAYFRON-BENJAMIN AND FRANCOIS
JJ.A.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.<o:p></o:p>Anin J.A.
delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant was charged and tried
(together with three others, the non-appellants herein) summarily before the
Accra Circuit Court presided over by his honour, Judge Atta-Fynn, on a first
count of conspiracy to rob and a second count of robbery, contrary to sections
23 (1) and 149 respectively of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The
particulars of offence alleged that the accused persons on 3 July 1972 at Accra
agreed together with a common purpose to commit a crime, to wit robbery; and
did rob one Mrs. Margaret Okyere of one Peugeot 404 car No. GK 2408 valued at
¢4,900.00. The salient facts as disclosed by the evidence of the five
prosecution witnesses were that the complainant parked and locked her car at about
8.30 p.m. at the Marine Drive beach near the Independence Square. She had gone
there to pray, accompanied and led in prayers by Prophetess Comfort Mensah.
After prayers, the ladies were returning to their parked car when they saw the
first three accused persons (led by the appellant herein carrying a gun)
standing by the car. As the complainant reached for her ignition. key, the
accused persons suddenly pounced on her and her companion, the prophetess. The
appellant, who was then wielding a gun, ordered the ladies to surrender all the
money they had on them. The complainant retorted that they carried no money on
them; but the appellant threatened that unless they obeyed his order forthwith
and surrendered all their money, they would be killed instantly. Fearing for
her dear life, the complainant was constrained to give up all she had on her,
which consisted of the princely sum of 50 pesewas. Not satisfied with the
booty, the appellant demanded with threats the complainant’s ignition key; and
after this had been reluctantly surrendered, the first three accused persons
entered the car and drove it away leaving the stranded ladies behind at the
beach to bemoan their loss and contemplate their misfortune and harrowing
experience. Recovering from the shock, they made a report to the police who
mounted an intensive search and succeeded in arresting the accused persons
while in the act of selling the stolen car to a buyer. The fourth accused
person was the spokesman for the gang during the abortive negotiations for the
sale of the stolen car; and he faced an abetment count at the joint trial. In
his judgment, the learned circuit judge held that the case for the prosecution
against the first three accused persons (including the appellant herein) had
been conclusively proved; and he duly found them guilty and convicted them on
the charges preferred against them. He then adjourned the trial to another date
“to enable the court to determine whether the Suppression of Robbery Decree,
1972 (N.R.C.D. 11), or the Subversion Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 90), should apply
to this case in respect of sentence. On the adjourned date, the learned circuit
judge pronounced the following. sentence:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“BY COURT
The offences were committed on 3 July 1972, and the accused persons were
charged before the court on 7 July 1972. N.R.C.D. 11 published on 1 February
1972, was superseded by N.R.C.D. 90 published on 17 July 1972. The case
commenced before N.R.C.D. 90 became law. Therefore even though the accused
persons were convicted after the passage of N.R.C.D. 90, they are not liable to
suffer punishment under that Decree since they were not dealt with under that
Decree. In my view, the accused do come under N.R.C.D. 11 which was operative
when they were arrested, charged and evidence heard. Accordingly the court
passes the following sentences on the accused persons: First accused: Kofi Badu
Count One Life Imprisonment Count Two Life Imprisonment Both terms concurrent.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In this
second appeal—after an unsuccessful appeal to the High Court—the appellant, who
was unrepresented, complained only about the sentence imposed on him by the
learned circuit judge. We ourselves were satisfied that his conviction was
proper and wholly justified; and hence did not disturb it. He implored us to
reduce the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him, on the grounds that he
was a first offender and young, being only 27 years old at the time of his
conviction; that he is married and has four children, two of them attending
school; that he has lost both parents; and that being the eldest child, he
shoulders a moral and customary obligation of looking after his younger sister
and two brothers, who are respectively attending a girls’ vocational institute
and undergoing training as apprentice tailors. He had repented of his crime and
attributed it to the bad company he kept and the influence of alcohol. In his
written petition, he promised to turn over a new leaf and “be of good use to
his wife, children, other dependants and the nation as a whole.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>At the
hearing of the appeal, we invited learned counsel for the respondent to answer
the legal questions whether (a) N.R.C.D. 11 was superseded by N.R.C.D. 90, as
was held by the learned trial circuit judge; and (b) whether the trial judge
was right in sentencing the appellant under N.R.C.D. 11 even though he was
charged, tried and convicted under sections 23 and 149 of the Criminal Code,
1960 (Ac</main>