ADOM vs. THE REPUBLIC [1976]DLHC341

Date	1976-10-30
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1976]DLHC341

OSEI-HWERE J.

A. A. MUNUFIE FOR THE APPELLANT.

OSEI STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1976]DLHC341
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >ADOM <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>THE REPUBLIC<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[HIGH
COURT, SUNYANI]<o:p></o:p>[1976] 1 GLR 59<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

DATE:
30 OCTOBER 1975.<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

A. A. MUNUFIE FOR THE APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p>

OSEI, STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

OSEI-HWERE J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.<o:p></o:p>The
appellant was arraigned before the District Court Grade I, Techiman, on a
charge of refusing to sell a bar of key soap contrary to sections 2 and 3
(1)(b) of the Price Control Decree, 1972 (NRCD 17). He pleaded not guilty and
after his trial he was found guilty, convicted and sentenced to three months’
imprisonment with hard labour. The main evidence on which the appellant was
convicted came from the first prosecution witness and this is what he said
during the examination-in-chief:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“On 1
April 1974, I went to a store near the post office in Techiman. The accused was
keeping the store at the time. I went to the store with Peprah Gyamfi. I bought
a tin of Blue Band margarine from the accused. I paid him and he gave me
change. I then asked him for a bar of key soap. He said he had none. I saw ten
cartons of key soap packed at the left corner of the store. As an active
citizen I reported the matter to the police. The police visited the store and
impounded the ten cartons of key soap to the police station.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>At the
close of the case for the prosecution the appellant’s counsel made a submission
of no case on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove all the
material ingredients of the offence. This was, however, rejected. The
appellant’s defence was mainly a denial that the first prosecution witness had
offered to buy the commodity and that he had refused to sell. The appellant who
is dissatisfied with his conviction has, accordingly, appealed to this court.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
following supplementary grounds of appeal were argued on behalf of the
appellant, viz:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“(1) The
judgment is against the weight of evidence because of the trial magistrate’s
failure to give due consideration to the defence put up. <o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(3) The
judgment is unreasonable because of the trial magistrate’s failure to give
reasons for disbelieving the defence case. <o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(4) The
trial magistrate erred in sentencing the accused to terms of imprisonment
without option of fine as the accused was a first offender.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>By far
the most important ground argued was the “additional supplementary ground of
appeal” which was set out as follows: “The judgment was based on a wrong
interpretation by the trial magistrate of the sections of NRCD 17, under which
the accused person was charged.” I found this ground of appeal so far-reaching
that after the appellant’s counsel had argued it, I permitted the state
attorney who appeared and argued on behalf of the respondent to call in the
senior state attorney to argue in reply to this ground. I propose to deal with
this ground.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Section 2
of the Price Con</main>