MENA vs. THE REPUBLIC [1977]DLCA1359

Date	1977-08-01
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1977]DLCA1359

LASSEY JA

KINGSLEY-NYINAH JA

ANNAN J.A.

APPELLANT IN PERSON.

J. BAMFORD-ADDO (MRS.) PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1977]DLCA1359
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >MENA <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>THE REPUBLIC <o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1977]1 GLR 346<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
1 AUGUST 1975<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

APPELLANT IN PERSON.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

LASSEY, KINGSLEY-NYINAH AND ANNAN JJ.A.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF LASSEY J.A.<o:p></o:p>This
appeal is against conviction and sentence. The appellant was tried summarily on
an information in the Circuit Court, Tarkwa, for having committed robbery on a
pregnant woman on a village path. The evidence was that the appellant stabbed
the woman in her palm and stomach in an attempt to rob her of money she carried
on her person.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
appellant appeal against the conviction and sentence to the High Court,
Sekondi, in its appellate jurisdiction, but the decision was unfavourable to
him, that court having dismissed both appeals. Dissatisfied with the decision
of the High Court on the ground that it was erroneous in law, the appellant
exercised his further right of appeal against conviction and sentence to this
court.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
appellant did not have the benefit of counsel and argued his own appeal. He
said that the finding of the trial judge was wrong as the evidence relied on by
the prosecution did not prove the offence of robbery and so the conviction
ought to be set aside.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>As to
sentence, the appellant’s complaint was in respect of the validity of the life
imprisonment imposed on him by the circuit court judge by virtue of section 2
of the Suppression of Robbery Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 11), instead of the
punishment prescribed for robbery by section 296 (1) of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1960 (Act 30). He argued that the circuit court judge had no lawful
powers to punish him under the new Decree for an offence which he was alleged
to have committed before the Decree was passed or came into force and therefore,
such an illegal sentence must not be allowed to remain. The appellant further
stated that the increased penalty for the offence of robbery was not intended
to apply to an offence which was alleged to have taken place on 22 March 1971.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Counsel
for the respondent replied by submitting that the case for the prosecution
depended entirely on the evidence of eyewitnesses which was believed by the
trial judge, and that that evidence sufficiently supported the conviction for
robbery. He said the conviction is right and should not be disturbed.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>On the
sentencing of the appellant to life imprisonment after his conviction, it was
submitted that the appellant could be lawfully sentenced to imprisonment for
life in respect of an offence of robbery committed under section 149 of the
Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), before N.R.C.D. 11 took effect. Counsel contended
that the circuit court judge’s view of section 2 of the Suppression of Robbery
Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 11), was correct and that there could be no questioning
of the validity of the appellant’s detention for life after a summary
conviction. She pointed out that the trial circuit court judge properly availed
himself of the new powers for punishment under N.R.C.D. 11 which prescribes
enhanced penalties for robbery committed under section 149 of the<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Criminal
Code, 1960 (Act 29), and further that although section 149 of the Criminal
Code, 1960 (Act 29), makes it an offence to commit robbery, yet on a summary
conviction by the High Court or the circuit court, the appropriate punishment
to impose is death or life imprisonment, and not the original penalty for
robbery prescribed under section 296 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960
(Act 30), which can be less than life imprisonment.<o:p></o:p>