QUAYSON vs. STATE GOLD MINING CORPORATION [1977]DLSC1400

Date	1977-03-02
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1977]DLSC1400

JONES-MENSAH J.

L. B. AKAINYAH FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

S. KWAMI TETTEH FOR THE DEFENDANTS.

[1977]DLSC1400
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >QUAYSON <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>STATE GOLD MINING CORPORATION <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, KUMASI]<o:p></o:p>[1977]2 GLR 151<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
2 MARCH 1977<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

L. B. AKAINYAH FOR THE PLAINTIFF.<o:p></o:p>

S. KWAMI TETTEH FOR THE DEFENDANTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

JONES-MENSAH J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF JONES-MENSAH J.<o:p></o:p>Evidence
in this matter was led before the late Ata-Bedu J. Unfortunately he did not
live to hear the able addresses of counsel in this case. As the evidence was
not in dispute counsel applied to this court to adopt the evidence given before
my late brother Ata-Bedu J. The court obliged. The account is as follows:<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
plaintiff was appointed an assistant dredge shiftsman with effect from 1 July
1971. He was appointed on a scale with a starting salary of ¢110.00 per mensem
ranging to ¢180.00 per mensem. The letter of appointment was tendered by the
plaintiff and admitted to these proceedings as exhibit A. That the appointment
was a senior staff position in the company’s staff classification is
unequivocally borne out by exhibit A. A formal service agreement was later executed
between the plaintiff and the defendant-corporation. This was tendered by the
defendant and admitted to the proceedings as exhibit 1. The formal service
agreement subjected the plaintiff to the rules, regulations and arrangements of
the defendant-corporation.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>On 25
April 1974 the defendants advised the plaintiff by letter tendered as exhibit B
of his appointment to the position of amalgamator. This appointment carried a
salary of ¢200.00 per mensem effective from 1 February 1974 and continued in the
status of senior staff. In a matter of months the plaintiff was again advised
by letter of 18 September 1974 (exhibit C) that he had a rise in salary
effective from 1 July 1974 and the new salary was ¢265.00 ranging by ¢20.00 to
a maximum of ¢365.00. There is no dispute that these gratifying letters were
welcomed by the plaintiff and that he accepted them and embarked on the
services happily. Before long however the spate of fortunes sharply reversed
when on 4 April 1975 the defendants addressed a letter to the plaintiff
advising him that owing to a contemplated reorganisation and streamlining of
the organisation, his appointment was to be terminated with effect from 9 April
1975 and he was to be entitled to one month’s pay in lieu of notice.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
plaintiff was dissatisfied with his fate and demanded, among other
entitlements, severance pay. He, however, accepted the defendants’ claim to
have conducted a reorganisation exercise which, as it turned out, did not go
beyond the isolated action of terminating solely the appointment of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff’s demand for severance pay of ¢8,500.00 was rejected
by the defendants. He therefore instituted this action to recover the severance
pay in accordance with the provisions of the Labour Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D.
157). His case was that he was a worker within the meaning of the Labour
Decree, 1967, and was therefore entitled to severance pay from the defendants
upon reorganisation. The defendants held a different view. They introduced
exhibit 2 which was the prevailing rules and regulations agreed between the
management and the union as to conditions of service of junior staff and
daily-rated employees. They argue that those rules do not cover the senior
staff of the corporation and that no negotiated rules existed for severance pay
in respect of senior staff; therefore they say, the plaintiff being a senior
staff member had no claim to severance pay. Be that as it may, the introduction
of exhibit 2 to the proceedings was in the view of this court irrevance. What
is important is who is a “worker” within the meaning of the Decree. Similarly,
the fact that severance is not provided for in exhibit 1 is irrelevant as the
plaintiff is not resting his case on his service conditions with the defendants
but on the Labour Decree, 1967 (N.L.C.D. 157). Paragraph 34 of the N.L.C.D. 157
provides as follows:<o:p></o:p>“Where an
organisation is closed down, or reorganised or amalgamated with another
organisation under a new name or on a change of ownership, the workers in such
organisation shall be entitled to severance pay for loss of employment:
Provided that no severance pay shall be payable to any worker in the case of a
reorganisation or amalgamation where the new body arising out of the
reorganisation or amalgamation undertakes to employ the worker on terms and
conditions which are the same as, or more favourable to the worker than, the
terms and conditions upon which the worker was employed immediately before the
reorganisation or amalgamation, so, however, that account shall be taken of his
past services and other accumulated benefits.”<o:p></o:p>Mr.
Akainyah argues that having regard to the nature of </main>