ASUMADU-SAKYI. II vs. OWUSU AND OTHERS [1978]DLHC1132

Date	1978-11-14
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1978]DLHC1132

ROGER KORSAH J.

E.D. KOM FOR THE APPELLANT-APPLICANT.

K. ASUMADU-SAKYI FOR THE RESPONDENTS

[1978]DLHC1132
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >ASUMADU-SAKYI. II <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>OWUSU AND OTHERS<o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, KUMASI]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[1979] GLR 423<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
14 NOVEMBER 1978<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

E.D. KOM FOR THE APPELLANT-APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p>

K. ASUMADU-SAKYI FOR THE RESPONDENTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

ROGER KORSAH J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF ROGER KORSAH J.<o:p></o:p>Bearing
on this application for stay of execution, many learned and weighty points have
been advanced. But, on reflection, it appears to me that the matter falls to be
decided on a few comparatively simple grounds.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The order
of which a stay is sought is that: the co-defendant-appellant-applicant
(hereinafter referred to as the applicant) do pay into court the sum of
¢1,029,592 within ten days from the date of the judgment appealed against.
Before I address myself to the merits or demerits of this application for stay,
I feel some explanation is due from me for ordering that the sum for which
judgment was given was to be paid into court.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>I have
already expressed in the body of my judgment in this suit, the view that the
Administration of Lands Acts, 1962 (Act 123), covers those cases in which land
is already known to belong to a particular stool and that is why no machinery
is provided under Act 123 for the resolution of rival claims. The provisions of
Act 123, in my view, thus apply only where the land is undoubtedly land
belonging to a particular stool. The State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125), on the
other hand, was fashioned to cater for all other cases where there may be
conflicting claims because there is no certainty as to whether the ownership of
land is in a stool or in an individual. The provisions of Act 123, were,
therefore, not meant, and cannot apply, to compensation claimed and payable
under Act 125. But it seems to me that, once it is determined that the land for
which compensation is claimed is the land of a particular stool, the
compensation which is payable is, as of that moment, affected by the provisions
of Act 123; and the compensation must necessarily be paid into the stool lands
account set up under section 18 of Act 123. It was the judgment in the present
suit which decided that the compensation, the subject-matter of this suit,
belonged to a particular stool—the Kumawu stool.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The only
way in which this court could ensure that the amount for which judgment was
given, which is part of a trust fund for the people or oman of Kumawu, would be
paid and transferred into the stool lands account for the benefit of the
people, was to order that the total amount for which judgment was obtained be
paid into court by certain date. That there is jurisdiction in this court to
give a judgment or make an order for payment of money into court within a
stipulated time cannot be doubted; for by Order, 42, r. 4 of the High Court
(Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), “A judgment for the. payment of
money into Court may be enforced by a writ of sequestration, or in cases in
which attachment is authorised by law, by attachment.” And I take the view
that, were jurisdiction not reposed in the court to make such an order, there
would have been no such provision in our rules of court. This view is
buttressed by the distinction which manifests itself in the rules of court
between an order for payment of money into court and a judgment for the
recovery of money by or payment of money to any person, when regard is had to
the different methods of enforcing them.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Whereas
under Order 42, r. 4 an order for the payment of money into court may be
enforced by sequestration or attachment of the person (the emphasis is mine),
under rule 3 of the same Order:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“A
judgment for the recovery by or payment to any person of money may be enforced
by the attachment and sale of the property of the party against whom judgment
was given or the decree made, or, subject to the provisions of Order 69, by his
imprisonment or both.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>