BRUTUW vs. AFERIBA AND ANOTHER [1978]DLHC1137

Date	1978-02-01
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1978]DLHC1137

OSEI-HWERE J.

J.B. SHORT FOR THE DEFENDANTS-APPLICANTS.

EWUSIE-WILSON FOR THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

[1978]DLHC1137
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >BRUTUW <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>AFERIBA AND ANOTHER<o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, CAPE COAST]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[1979] GLR 566<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
1 FEBRUARY 1979<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

J.B. SHORT FOR THE DEFENDANTS-APPLICANTS.<o:p></o:p>

EWUSIE-WILSON FOR THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

OSEI-HWERE J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.<o:p></o:p>On 7
November 1978, this court dismissed the defendants’ motion which sought for an
order from the court to strike out the plaintiff‘s action in limine. By the
endorsement on her writ the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants is for a
declaration that the judgment of the court dated 26 August 1975 and confirmed
by the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 16 June 1977 should be set aside
on the ground of fraud. The defendants have since then lodged an appeal to the
Court of Appeal against the ruling of this court dismissing their motion. They
have now come to court by this motion praying that the proceedings should be
stayed pending the result of their appeal to the Court of Appeal. In the
affidavit supporting their application the defendants raised the following pertinent
matters as their bedrock:<o:p></o:p>“4. That
the appeal raised questions of law of much complexity and general interest and
it is desirable that the Court of Appeal should pronounce on them. <o:p></o:p>5. That
if the action herein were to continue in this honourable court and a decision
given it would in the first place render futile any decision by the Court of
Appeal. 6. That the proceedings would in fact be proceeding in competition with
that before the Court of Appeal. 7. That considering the nature of the suit it
would be proper for the hearing to be suspended pending the decision by the
court since the question whether the statement of claim herein disclosed a
triable cause of action will be decided by the Court of Appeal.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
plaintiff has filed an affidavit in opposition wherein she maintains, among
other matters, that her action is brought on the ground of fraud which she can
abundantly prove. According to her, the motion is only brought to stop this
court from hearing the case.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Our rules
of court, the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), do not make
any provisions to cover the instant application. Despite this want of statutory
authority it is well recognised that a court of justice has inherent
jurisdiction to stay its own proceedings which are an abuse of its process,
such as frivolous, vexatious or harrassing proceedings or those which are
manifestly groundless or in which there is clearly no cause of action. But
apart from staying its own proceedings (in the sense of a discontinuance, in
which case cadit quaestio, as explained in Selig v. Lion [1891] 1 Q.B. 513) the
court has an inherent jurisdiction to stay or suspend its proceedings pending
the determination of the Court of Appeal. This jurisdiction of the court which
is, of course, discretionary, would only be exercised if there were special
circumstances warranting it. In Republic v. Committee of Inquiry (R.T. Briscoe
(Ghana) Ltd.); Ex parte R. T. Briscoe (Ghana) Ltd. [1976] 1 G.L.R. 166, C.A.
the Court of Appeal held that the mere allegation that there had been
misdirection or a series of them would not be deemed special circumstances to
grant a stay of proceedings pending an appeal. So also will the court not stay
proceedings in the hope that the appeal may succeed. In the analogous case of
Willow Wren Canal Carrying Co., Ltd. v. British Transport Commission [1956] 1
All E.R. 567, where the defendants sought to stay proceedings until a Bill,
which was then before Parliament and which in its then form would relieve the
defendants of their statutory obligations might become law the court held that
the plaintiffs were entitled to have their action tried and that the court
would not take into account the possible effect of the Bill then before
Parliament. Upjohn J. at p. 569 made the following pertinent remarks:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“I have
no doubt that the action will be of a very heavy nature and will take many days
to hear; ... and I accept at once that it will be a most expensive action to
try. It is said that at the end of that action a judge would be bound to
suspend an injunction, if he thinks that the plaintiffs have established their
right to one, until the fate of the Bill is known. It is argued that the proper
course, therefore, is to let this action be stayed until the fate of the Bill
is known. A preliminary objection is taken to that, which seems to me to be
fatal to the application, and it is this: sitting in this court, it is my duty
to see that litigants have their cases tried, as they are entitled to, and I
cannot take into account the possible effect of some Bill now before Parliament
which, if passed into law in its present form, may have some effect on the
rights of the parties. That seems to me to be a c</main>