HAYFORD vs. STATE HOUSING CORPORATION [1978]DLHC1145

Date	1978-02-17
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1978]DLHC1145

AMUA-SEKYI J.

E.N. MOORE FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

B.QUAYE FOR THE DEFENDANTS.

[1978]DLHC1145
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >HAYFORD <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>STATE HOUSING CORPORATION<o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;[1979] GLR 181<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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DATE:
17 FEBRUARY 1978<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

E.N. MOORE FOR THE PLAINTIFF.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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AMUA-SEKYI J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.<o:p></o:p>By his
writ of summons, the plaintiff Davy Hayford, claims, as agent of Duncan
Augustt, the return of a deposit of ¢10,000 paid by the said Duncan Augustt for
an estate houses at Teshie-Nungua. The facts giving rise to the claim are not
in dispute. They are that on or about 9 August 1976, the plaintiff, on behalf
of Duncan Augustt, applied for the allocation of an estate house to the said
Duncan Augustt. The application was accepted and the plaintiff, on behalf of
Duncan Augustt, paid a deposit of ¢10,000 towards the purchase price of the
house. No house was allocated to Duncan Augustt. On or about 10 February 1977,
the plaintiff informed the defendants that Duncan Augustt was no longer
interested in the allocation of an estate house. and asked the defendants to
refund the deposit of ¢10,000. The defendants refused to do so, and on these
proceedings have put up two defences, namely: (a) the plaintiff not being a
party to the contract cannot sue thereon and (b) no time was fixed by the
contract for the allocation of a house to Duncan Augutt.s.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>This
ruling is concerned with the first of these two grounds since, if the plaintiff
has no right to bring the action, the defendants are entitled to an order
dismissing the suit without considering the alternative defence.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In
support of his objection, Mr. Quaye, counsel for the defendants, referred to
the case of Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. v. Harlley [1976] 1 G.L.R. 158, C.A. where
at p. 162 Anin J.A. delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal said, “The
fundamental principle of the common law is that only a party or privy to a
contact can repudiate or else sue for rescission of contract, or claim benefit
therefrom.” Counsel contended that although the decision of the ordinary bench
was reversed by the full bench the principle of law stated by Anin J. A. was
accepted by the full bench.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>“I have
read the judgment of the ordinary bench as well as that of the full bench,
which is reported sub nom. Harilley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R.
179. In delivering the judgment of the court, Azu Crabbe C.J. said at p. 195:<o:p></o:p>“. . . I
think the conclusion based on lack of privity of contract requires closer
consideration. The common law principle that no one is entitled to or bound by
the terms of a contract to which he was not an original party has normally been
rigorously applied by the courts. But this doctrine of privity of contract
which as proclaimed in the nineteenth century is now subject to certain
important qualifications.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>And at p.
198 he continued, “In my judgment, lack ot privity does not preclude a
plaintiff from maintaining an action for money had and received to his use.”
The Ejura Farms case was one in which the plaintiff Harlley sought to recover
from Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. (hereafter called Ejura Farm) and the Ghana
Commercial Bank, the sum of ¢30,000 being the value of stocks, the proceeds of
which the Ghana Commercial Bank had paid to Ejura Farms under agreements
entered into between Ejura Farms and Aboasa Food Supplies Ltd. and between the
Ghana Commercial Bank and the plaintiff Harlley. In that case the decision of
the ordinary bench was that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for
money had and received by the defendants to his use or sue for conversion,
whereas the decision of the full bench was that he could. On the first ground
of the claim of the plaintiff in that case, Azu Crabbe C.J. said at pp.
198-199:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
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