LARTEY AND OTHERS vs. BAKU II AND OTHERS [1979]DLCA1082

Date	1979-04-25
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1979]DLCA1082

APALOO C.J.

ANIN JA

KORANTENG-ADDOW J.A.

JOE REINDORF FOR THE APPLICANTS.

E. D. KOM FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

[1979]DLCA1082
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >LARTEY AND OTHERS <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>BAKU II AND OTHERS<o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL, ACCRA] <o:p></o:p>[1978] GLR 257<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
25 APRIL 1979<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

JOE REINDORF FOR THE APPLICANTS.<o:p></o:p>

E. D. KOM FOR THE RESPONDENTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

APALOO C.J., ANIN AND KORANTENG-ADDOW JJ.A.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.<o:p></o:p>Anin J.A.
delivered the ruling of the court. On 5 March 1979, we upheld the
plaintiff-respondents’ counsel’s preliminary objection to the competency of the
motion for leave to apply for the review of the judgment of the ordinary bench
of the Court of Appeal by the full bench under section 3 (2) (a) of the Courts
(Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), and after dismissing the motion, we
reserved our reasons. We now give those reasons.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The final
judgment of the ordinary bench was delivered on 20 July 1977; and the instant
application for leave for review was not filed until 31 January 1979—that is,
after a lapse of one year and seven months.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>At the
hearing of the motion, learned counsel for the respondents argued a preliminary
objection that it was time-barred and ought consequently to be dismissed in
limine. He cited in support the relevant rules of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970
(C.I. 13), which regulate the time limits for the lodging of the motion.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>For the
applicants, learned counsel conceded that the relevant procedural rules are
contained in C.I. 13; but he entreated us to waive non-compliance with the
relevant rules for his client and allow the motion for review to be heard on
the merits in the interest of justice since important issues of law, especially
estoppel and the customary land law, fall for determination in the suit.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Whether a
review application or an appeal has been properly lodged before a court or not,
depends on the relevant enactments and statutory rules regulating them, and in
what circumstances a review or appeal lies and how it may be lodged. Litigants
do not enjoy a common law right to appeal or review at will.<o:p></o:p>In the
famous words of Lord Atkin in Moore v. Tayee (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 43 at pp. 44-45,
P.C.:<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>“After
all, it is to be remembered that all appeals in this country and elsewhere
exist merely by statute and unless the statutory conditions are fulfilled no
jurisdiction is given to any Court of Justice to entertain them ... It is quite
true that their Lordships, ... like any other Court, are bound by the statute
law, and if the statute law says there shall be no jurisdiction in a certain
event, and that event has occurred, then it is impossible for their Lordships
or for any other Court to have jurisdiction.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Equally
pertinent and eloquent was the observation of Akufo-Addo C.J. in Nye v. Nye
[1967] G.L.R. 76 at pp. 82-83, C.A. (full bench):<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“It must
be appreciated that there is no inherent right of appeal in a litigant; nor
indeed is there an inherent power in any court to hear appeals. Both the ri</main>