BREFOH vs. THE REPUBLIC [1979]DLHC11120

Date	1979-09-21
Suit No.	[1980] GLR 679
Citation No.	[1979]DLHC11120

TAYLOR J.

G. K. MENSA-ETSI FOR THE APPLICANT.

YAW WIREDU-PEPRAH

ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE REPUBLIC

[1979]DLHC11120
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><div class="WordSection1">

BREFOH<o:p></o:p>

vs.<o:p></o:p>

THE REPUBLIC<o:p></o:p>

[HIGH COURT,
TAMALE]<o:p></o:p>

[1980] GLR 679&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1979<o:p></o:p>

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<h1 style="margin-left:0cm;text-align:justify">COUNSEL<o:p></o:p></h1>

G. K. MENSA-ETSI FOR THE APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p>

YAW WIREDU-PEPRAH, ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE REPUBLIC<o:p></o:p>

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CORAM:<o:p></o:p>

TAYLOR J.<o:p></o:p>

<h1 align="center" style="margin-left:0cm;text-align:center;border:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0cm;mso-padding-alt:1.0pt 0cm 1.0pt 0cm">JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR
J.<o:p></o:p></h1>

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“A
statute or Act of Parliament is the will of the legislature.” This is the
opening sentence in Odgers’ exposition
of the nature of a statute as is contained in Odgers’ Construction of Deeds and
Statutes (5th ed.), at p. 233. In his
oft-quoted treatise on the Interpretation of Statutes (11th ed.), Sir Maxwell
also indicated in his very first sentence
the basic and paramount principle
applicable in searching
for the said<o:p></o:p>

“will” of the legislature. As is also so
stated in Maxwell, “A statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to
which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent of them that made
it.” This rule is supported in Maxwell by reference to Coke’s Institutes, the famous Sussex Peerage Case
(1844) 11 C1. &amp; F. 85 and Fordyce v. Bridges (1847) 1 H.L. Cas. 1.<o:p></o:p>

This
fundamental rule of interpretation is the unruly horse of the judiciary of
almost all common law countries. I cannot pretend
that it is easy to ride it but by the nature of our judicial function,
I must come to grips with it
when the occasion calls for it. This is one such occasion. This is simple
application for bail pending trial.
In our traditional approach such cases are invariably dealt with in as casual a
manner as is consistent with some
form of expeditious justice as I had occasion to remark in Okoe v. The Republic [1976 1 G.L.R. 80 at p. 83. In this case,
however, the applicant is asking for bail in a murder case pending before this court. Applications for bail
before trial have for some time now been regulated by statutory provisions and the entitlement of an
applicant can only be ascertained on a true construction of these provisions.<o:p></o:p>

There
is, however, at the moment, what I consider to be ill-conceived views in many
legal and judicial circles, that bail
in murder cases has been completely proscribed by legislation and consequently
that the superior courts have absolutely
no jurisdiction to grant bail in such murder cases under any circumstances whatsoever. This is most unfortunate and
in my respectful opinion it is the reason why it is essential that the true and proper principles applicable
to the interpretation of the subsisting statutory provisions need to be adequately canvassed in order to
determine their relevance in applications for bail pending trial. The instant
application therefore is ill-suited for casual disposal.<o:p></o:p>

Furthermore, I have noted, since 1 December 1975, when I first endeavoured to expound our principles for bail