REPUBLIC vs. GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE APPIAH AND OTHERS [1980]DLCA1628

REPUBLIC vs. GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE APPIAH... [1980]DLCA1628

Date	1980-07-08
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1980]DLCA1628

EDUSEI JA

EDWARD WIREDU J.A

ABBAN J.

TSATSU TSIKATA FOR THE APPELLANTS.

NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

[1980]DLCA1628
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >REPUBLIC <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE
APPIAH AND OTHERS<o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL, ACCRA] <o:p></o:p>[1980] GLR 736<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
8 JULY 1981<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

TSATSU TSIKATA FOR THE APPELLANTS.<o:p></o:p>

NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

EDUSEI, EDWARD WIREDU JJ.A. AND ABBAN
J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.<o:p></o:p>Abban J.
delivered the judgment of the court. The appeal is from the ruling of Cecilia
Koranteng-Addow J., sitting at the High Court, Accra. The appellants, in an ex
parte motion, sought leave to issue an order of certiorari to quash what was
described as directives issued by the government purporting to dismiss the
appellants from the employment of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation.
They also asked for an injunction directed against the Attorney-General
restraining the government from assuming or usurping the functions of Ghana
Industrial Holding Corporation by purporting to exercise the right of
dismissing the appellants who are the employees of Ghana Industrial Holding
Corporation. The third remedy was for an injunction to be directed against the
Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation restraining the Ghana Industrial Holding
Corporation from taking any steps against the appellants on the basis of the
purported directives.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
application named the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation as the first respondent
and the Attorney-General as the second respondent and they will hereafter be
referred to as such. After hearing counsel for the appellants, the learned High
Court judge refused to grant the appellants leave. Hence this appeal.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Seven
grounds of appeal were filed and argued together. The grounds substantially,
complained that the learned judge erred in refusing to grant leave and that she
was wrong in law in holding that the government was not required to act
judicially in giving directives to the management of the first respondent to
dismiss the appellants. They also contended that the learned judge erred in
applying the provisions of section 13 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act
51).<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>We must
observe that the learned High Court judge in her ruling appeared to have
treated the ex parte motion as if she was dealing with the substantive motion.
However, because of the view we have taken of this matter, we will confine
ourselves to the issue as to whether there was a prima facie case which entitled
the appellants to be granted leave.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
learned judge’s refusal to grant leave was based on about three main grounds.
The certiorari was directed against the second respondent and the learned judge
held that it would not lie since the part played by the government was not
“tantamount to a decision-making” which could have formed “the subject-matter
of investigation and therefore be quashable.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>With
respect to the learned judge, the kind of directives as complained of could not
have been issued without the government first taking a decision of some sort. A
reasonable government like the one represented by the second respondent, with
due appreciation of the consequences of its actions, could not have given
directives affecting the rights and employment of so many people without any
factual basis. Surely, the directives could not have been issued by the said
authority without first going through the process of examining and evaluating
facts and factors relative to the subject-matter of the directives and then
taking a decision on them in one way or the other. The directives could only be
the outcome of a decision.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></main>