FORSON vs. ADDISON [1980]DLHC1581

Date	1980-02-24
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1980]DLHC1581

TWUMASI J.

K. BRENU FOR THE APPLICANT.

GAISIE FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1980]DLHC1581
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >FORSON<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;vs. <o:p></o:p>ADDISON<o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, SEKONDI] <o:p></o:p>[1980] GLR 518<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
24
FEBRUARY 1981<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

K. BRENU FOR THE APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

TWUMASI J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.<o:p></o:p>On 23
January 1981, Mr. Ebo Bentsi-Enchill, counsel for the plaintiff herein, filed a
motion on notice under Order 59, r. 21 of the High Court (Civil Procedure)
Rules, 1954 (L.N.140A). By that motion, this court was called upon to exercise
its prerogative, power to commit to prison, one J. K. Addison, the defendant in
this suit. The motion accused J. K. Addison of wilful refusal to comply with an
order of the court given on 7 March 1980, to file what the applicant described
as “proper accounts” in respect of three named persons. According to the
applicant, the court fixed one month from the date of the order as the deadline
for its compliance. Inasmuch as the defendant defaulted in rendering the
“proper accounts,” he was, in the opinion of the applicant, guilty of contempt
of court and liable to imprisonment. The motion was duly served on the
defendant and his solicitor, Mr. Gaisie. The latter has raised a preliminary
point in law of procedural character. The point consisted of a complaint that
the application was incompetent because it was not made in consequence of a
prior leave of the court. In other words, the objectioner contended that the
grant of leave of the court was a precondition for the institution of contempt
proceedings. The buttress for this submission was the explanatory note in the
English Annual Practice (The White Book) (1962 ed.), pp. 1742-1743. There was
another criticism of the motion. It was argued that the application ought to
have been brought under Order 52, rr. 2 and 4.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Needless
to point out, Order 52, rr. 2 and 4 when carefully construed, deal with a
motion for a rule nisi, an order to show cause, a motion to set aside, remit or
enforce an award, or a motion for attachment, and they enjoin applicants to
state in general terms, the grounds of their motions. No relevance whatsoever
can, in my view, be attached to Order 52, rr. 2 and 4 in resolving the issue
that has arisen for determination.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The focal
point of the issue is the true construction of Order 59, r. 21. Here, as I have
said, the view of Mr. Gaisie diverges sharply from that of Mr. Kweku Brenu for
the applicant who argued, in effect, that the prior leave of the court was not
required to validate an application for the committal of a person who has
disobeyed an order of the court. And he urged the court to subscribe to that
view as the true meaning of Order 59, r. 21. The latter rule, draws a sharp
distinction between two categories of contempt.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The first
category includes contempts committed in facie curiae (in the face of the
court) such as insulting a judge or disturbing or obstructing the orderly
proceedings of a court. Falling under this category also are acts committed or
omitted in disobedience of a lawful order of a court. Contempts of this nature
are committed either in the full view of the court or with the knowledge that
the court will be aware of it when it comes to supervise an order made. Ex
facie contempts or disobedience of court orders are punishable by imprisonment
by a peremptory or instantaneous order on the court’s own motion: see Re
Pollard (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 106.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
second category of contempt is less obvious than the first and is committed
outside the view of the court and has nothing to do with the disobedience of an
order of a court. This consists of acts prejudicial to or obstructive of the
administration of justice, or the due course of the law; or prejudicial
comments by newspapers on cases pending before the court; or intimidation or
corruption of a judge or juror; or general attacks on the courts or judges. In
all these cases, the court does not exercise its punitive powers on its own
motion. It is first necessary to ask for leave to apply for a writ of
attachment against the culprit. An application for mandamus, prohibition and
certiorari, like an application for a writ of attachment, requires prior leave
of the court and it must be accompanied by a statement and an affidavit of the
grounds for the issue of the writ: see Order 59, r. 21 (1) and (2) and
Amenlemah II v. Arizi Polley II [1965] G.L.R. 405.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>