POBEE ALIAS ARKO vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980]DLHC1617

Date	1980-11-13
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1980]DLHC1617

TWUMASI J.

D. Y. BOATENG FOR THE APPLICANT.

T. AHLIJAH CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE REPUBLIC.

[1980]DLHC1617
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >POBEE ALIAS ARKO <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>THE REPUBLIC<o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, SEKONDI] <o:p></o:p>[1980] GLR 743<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
13 NOVEMBER 1981<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

D. Y. BOATENG FOR THE APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p>

T. AHLIJAH, CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE
REPUBLIC.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

TWUMASI J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.<o:p></o:p>The
accused who is arraigned on indictment before this court for having committed
the first degree felony of attempted murder contrary to section 48 of the
Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), has pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. He,
however, prays the court to accept a plea of “guilty” to the lesser offence of
causing intentional and unlawful harm contrary to section 69 of the same Code
aforesaid.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The facts
of the case are, inter alia, that the accused inflicted severe cutlass wounds
on his wife with the obvious intention of killing her. Miraculously, the wife
did not succumb to the wounds. Hence the charge of attempted murder. These
facts are being outlined here to enable everybody to appreciate the serious
consequences of the matter in its proper perspective.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>To my
mind, it would be nothing short of a mockery of justice, if a person who
commits a serious offence and ought to face the full rigours of the law, were
to be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offence which would inure to his
benefit in the sense that he would be given a minor punishment far
incommensurate with the gravity of the crime he has committed. It seems to me
to be pre-eminently important that before a court acquits an accused person of
the offence charged, and accepts a plea of “guilty” to some other offence not
charged, the trial court ought to take into consideration the existence or
non-existence of the evidence required to sustain the crime charged. If there
is strong prima facie evidence to support the offence charged, a court ought
not to accept the plea of “guilty” to some other offence not charged largely
because that would result in injustice. In my view, it should be the duty of
courts of criminal jurisdiction not to set bad precedents. The provisions of
section 239 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) (which permit
accused persons to plead guilty to offences not charged) should be sparingly
applied in exceptional cases only and should not be used to create a leeway
through which criminals could escape penal sanctions attached to the offences
they commit. I suppose that the real intention of the legislature in enacting
section 239 (2) of Act 30 was not to create a loophole in the law through which
accused persons can easily escape due punishment for crimes committed. The
provision is designed to facilitate and expedite the disposal of criminal
cases, i.e. where the facts do not support the offence charged, it would be
pointless to go through a futile exercise of trying the case. The best way
should be to cut matters short by accepting a plea of guilty of the offence not
charged even if it should involve a lesser punishment.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>For these
reasons, I would order a stay of the instant proceedings under section 239 (2)
of Act 30 and direct that the accused be tried on the original charge of attempted
murder. I do not intend to acquit him of that charge. Instead, I would defer
the matter to the best judgment of a jury.<o:p></o:p>

<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></main>