NANA YIADOM I vs. NANA AMANIAMPONG AND OTHERS [1980]DLSC1613

Date	1980-03-09
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1980]DLSC1613

APALOO C.J

SOWAH JSC

ARCHER JSC

ANIN JSC

CHARLES JSC

CRABBE ADADE JSC

TAYLOR J.S.C.

TSATSU TSIKATA FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

POBEE (NANA AKUFO-ADDO WITH HIM) FOR THE FIRST DEFENDANT.

C. TETTEH SOLICITOR-GENERAL (MRS ZWENNES MRS. ADUSA AMANKWA PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEYS WITH HIM) FOR THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

[1980]DLSC1613
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >NANA YIADOM I <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>NANA AMANIAMPONG AND OTHERS<o:p></o:p>[SUPREME COURT, ACCRA] <o:p></o:p>[1980] GLR 3<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
9
MARCH 1981<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

TSATSU TSIKATA FOR THE PLAINTIFF.<o:p></o:p>

POBEE (NANA AKUFO-ADDO WITH HIM) FOR THE FIRST
DEFENDANT.<o:p></o:p>

C. TETTEH, SOLICITOR-GENERAL (MRS ZWENNES, MRS. ADUSA
AMANKWA, PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEYS, WITH HIM) FOR THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

APALOO C.J., SOWAH, ARCHER, ANIN,
CHARLES <o:p></o:p>

CRABBE ADADE AND TAYLOR JJ.S.C.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.<o:p></o:p>Apaloo
C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. The plaintiff alleges that she is the
queenmother of Effiduasi, Ashanti. It is in that right that she brought this
action. Her present status has been challenged in the pleadings. She
accordingly sought and obtained leave to amend her capacity as “a citizen of
Ghana hailing from Ashanti Mampong Traditional Area”. In the view that we take
of this case, it is not necessary to pronounce on her right to bring this suit.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The first
defendant is the paramount chief of Mampong, Ashanti. This is a traditional
office of great importance and the holder of such office is held in high esteem
by his subjects and strangers alike. But he cannot come by this office unless
he has been “nominated, elected and installed in accordance with customary law
and usage.” Such pre-eminence does the institution of chieftaincy enjoy in our
traditional set-up, that it is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, 1979,
art. 177. It is also copiously regulated by legislation. The current statute on
chieftaincy, is the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370).<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The first
defendant was also a director of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board. While holding
that office, he allegedly engaged in certain financial transactions which
attracted adverse comment from a committee, i.e. the Archer Committee of
Inquiry into the affairs of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (the Archer
Committee). The first defendant seems to have been aggrieved by the findings of
that committee and sought to have them vacated by the special tribunal. Not
only was he unsuccessful, but that tribunal proceeded to confirm the adverse
findings against him and said “the petitioner (meaning the first defendant)
should be disqualified from holding any public office in the country€”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In all
probability, it is this holding that provided the motivation for this suit in
which the plaintiff seeks to invoke the original jurisdiction of this court and
invites us to declare that, “the first defendant has disqualified himself from
continuing in office as paramount or any other kind of chief.” She also sought
other consequential reliefs. It is not necessary to reproduce the consequential
reliefs sought by the plaintiff in this ruling but it is sufficient to observe
that they can only properly be granted if the first defendant has ceased to be
a paramount chief and yet was continuing to hold himself out as such.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It seems
plain to us that notwithstanding the way in which the plaint is couched, it is
in substance a claim to have it declared that the first defendant has ceased to
be a chief by operation of law. A chief becomes one because he is placed on a
stool, that is, enstooled. When he is removed from it, he is said to be
destooled. These are the expressions which both usage and legislation have hallowed:
see section 51 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370). The fact that both the
plaint and the plaintiff’s counsel shrank from using these expressions does not
lead us to believe that these proceedings are in substance and truth other than
destoolment proceedings.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>