REPUBLIC vs. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE AHANTA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX PARTE BOSOMAKORA II [1982]DLHC2185

REPUBLIC vs. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE AHANTA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX PARTE BO... [1982]DLHC2185

Date	1982-11-22
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1982]DLHC2185

TWUMASI J.

D. D. GWIRA FOR THE APPLICANT.

AHLIJAH CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENTS

[1982]DLHC2185
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >REPUBLIC <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE AHANTA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX PARTE BOSOMAKORA
II <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, SEKONDI]<o:p></o:p>[1982-83] GLR 231<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
22 NOVEMBER 1982<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

D. D. GWIRA FOR THE APPLICANT.<o:p></o:p>

AHLIJAH, CHIEF STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE RESPONDENTS<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

TWUMASI J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.<o:p></o:p>This
application seeks an order of certiorari to quash the proceedings in a suit
instituted before the judicial committee of the Ahanta Traditional Council. The
applicant is the chief of Takoradi and it would appear from the proceedings
before the said committee that certain persons preferred destoolment charges
against him and that the trial terminated in his disfavour. On the basis of a
few grounds stated by him the applicant herein claims that the proceedings are
amenable to certiorari and prays this court to quash same. The applicant
assails the jurisdiction of the judicial committee. He alleges bias and denial
to him of his right to be heard. He questions the compositions of the judicial
committee. He pinpoints procedural errors. On the question of jurisdiction,
counsel for the applicant submitted that the destoolment charges were not laid
by the accredited kingmakers. Hence the charges were not properly laid before
the committee and the latter had no right or jurisdiction to entertain them. He
relied on sections 2-4 of the Chieftaincy (Destoolment Proceedings)
Regulations, 1963 (L.I. 309). These sections require that destoolment charges
must first be investigated by accredited elders before they are referred to the
traditional council for adjudication. They also provide that only the
accredited elders who investigate the destoolment charges are entitled to
appear before the traditional council. This procedure was not followed. The
Chief State Attorney, Mr. Ahlijah, submitted that the repeal of the Chieftaincy
Act, 1961 (Act 81), spelt the demise of the L.I. 309, it being a statutory
instrument made under Act 81. He argued that inasmuch as L.I. 309 was not saved
by the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), that statutory instrument ceased to
apply. He cited a number of statutes where express provisions are made saving
statutory instruments made under repealed statutes. I entirely agree with the
learned Chief State Attorney. In the English case of Watson v. Winch [1916] 1
K.B. 688 at p. 691 Sankey J. (as he then was) stated:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“When a
statute is repealed any bye-law made thereunder ceases to be operative unless
there is a saving clause in the new statute preserving the old bye-law. There
appear to be two reasons for this: First, because otherwise there might be two
inconsistent codes relating to the same matter ... Secondly, because the usual
practice is to insert in the later statute a section expressly preserving
previously made by-laws if it is intended that they shall remain in force.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>If I may
add to what Sankey J. stated, where bye-laws or statutory instruments are made
under the new statute which repealed the old the clear intention of the
legislature is that the new bye-laws have replaced the old bye-laws in the same
manner as the new statute has replaced the old. The two statutory instruments
if allowed to co-exist may create inconsistencies. For example, the provisions
of L.I. 309 and those of the Chieftaincy (Proceedings and Functions)
(Traditional Councils) Regulations, 1972 (L.I. 798) are inconsistent. In my
view, the most pertinent enactment on this issue is section 33 of Act 370 which
provides that: “No person shall be deemed to be entitled by this Act to
institute proceedings for destoolment of a chief unless he is entitled to do so
under customary law.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The issue
here relates properly and closely to capacity of the persons who preferred the
destoolment charges rather than to the jurisdiction of the traditional council.
As a matter of fact, the applicant raised objection to the capacity of his
accusers. The matter was gone into and the objection was overruled. It seems to
me therefore that the applicant’s remedy lies in an appeal on this ground.
Counsel for the applicant further argued that the composition of the judicial
committee should not be less than five in order to have power to hear and
determine chieftaincy disputes. Section 3 of L.I. 798 provides:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“3 (1) A
judicial committee shall be appointed by a Traditional Council and shall
consist of five persons all of whom shall be members of that Council. <o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(2) A
judicial committee shall elect one of their number as Chairman, who shall
preside over the committee. <o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(3) A
judicial committee shall be duly </main>