NKRUMAH vs. FOLI AND ANOTHER [1983]DLHC2163

Date	1983-01-31
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1983]DLHC2163

TWUMASI J.

RICHARD APALOO FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

KOBENA ACQUAYE FOR THE DEFENDANTS.

[1983]DLHC2163
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >NKRUMAH <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>FOLI AND ANOTHER <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, SEKONDI]<o:p></o:p>[1982-83] GLR 1046<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
31 JANUARY
1983<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

RICHARD APALOO FOR THE PLAINTIFF. <o:p></o:p>

KOBENA ACQUAYE FOR THE DEFENDANTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

TWUMASI J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.<o:p></o:p>The
plaintiff claims against the defendants jointly and severally ¢10,000 damages
for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The facts of
the case were that on 21 November 1979, the plaintiff and her four daughters
were arrested by the Sekondi Police and locked up in cells. They were released
on bail the next day and later prosecuted before the District Court, Sekondi,
on a charge of assault. The first defendant gave evidence as the complainant
and victim of the assault. The second defendant is the father of the first
defendant. He never accused anybody of assaulting him. He, however, went to the
police station on the day the plaintiff and her four daughters were arrested
and detained. He also attended court during the trial but never gave evidence.
The criminal prosecution terminated with the acquittal of the plaintiff and the
conviction of her four children. The plaintiff thereafter instituted this
action claiming that her arrest and detention were unlawful and were caused by
the defendants. She also accused the defendants of malicious prosecution. She
claims damages for loss of earnings for the period of the trial which took
fifteen adjournments at the rate of ¢200 a day. She also claims ¢600 as
solicitor’s fees and transport charges to and from court during the trial. Her
daughters did not sue.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The first
defendant states that she alone lodged a complaint of assault with the police
against the plaintiff and her four daughters and that her father, the second
defendant, merely came to meet her at the entrance of the police station. She
and her father vehemently deny ever causing the arrest and detention of the
plaintiff and also responsibility for the subsequent prosecution of the
plaintiff. They also dispute the plaintiff’s entitlement to the damages
claimed. I would first deal with the plaintiff’s arrest. There is no dispute
that policemen arrested the plaintiff and her four daughters upon a complaint
of assault lodged by the first defendant against them. The plaintiff’s evidence
and that of her daughter, Grace York, the first plaintiff witness, showed that
none of the defendants actually led the police to the houses of the plaintiff
and her daughters. The first defendant said she mentioned the names of her
assailants to the police and the latter went to arrest them. She never
authorised or directed the arrest. Her father never did so either. How then did
the police know the plaintiff and her children so as to be able to go and
arrest them without the first defendant identifying them? This is a matter for
the plaintiff to explain because she accuses the defendants of causing her
arrest. In answer to a question in cross-examination the plaintiff called out
the names of the three policemen who arrested her and her four children as
Constables Krah and Awuku and Sergeant Mensah. She did not call any of them to
testify on her behalf as to whether they were authorised and directed by the
defendants to effect her arrest. The plaintiff said a policeman went to her and
told her to follow him to the police station. She asked him what for, but the
policeman told her that she would know the reason for her arrest at the police
station. And the first plaintiff witness said the plaintiff came in company
with the police to arrest her and her other sisters to the police station.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The law is
quite clear that for a person to be held liable for an arrest effected by a
policeman there must be cogent evidence that that person actually authorised
and directed the arrest using the policeman as a mere agent not acting on a
discretion of his own. In other words, the person, if he is a complainant, must
be considered not as a party reporting a crime to the police officer in
consequence of which the other person was arrested but as a principal party
causing the arrest to be made and therefore liable in trespass: see Hopkins v.
Crowe (1836) 4 Ad. &amp; EI. 774; Grinham v. Willey (1859) 4 H. &amp; N. 496;
Morgan v. Parkinson Howard Ltd. [1961] G.L.R. 68 and Narwu v. Armah [1972] 2
G.L.R. 331 at p. 334, C.A. In Hopkins v. Crowe (supra) X called a policeman and
told him to arrest Y for an offence. The policeman told X that if he was
prepared to charge Y then he the policeman would arrest him. X said he would
charge Y. Thereupon the policeman arrested Y. This was held to be actual
direction and authorisation. Where therefore a person upon making a report of a
crime committed against himself or another, leads the police to the house or
place of abode of the suspect for the purpose of identifying him to the police
for his arrest he would not be liable for the consequence of the arrest unless
he actively does some act beyond mere identification such as instructing the
police officer to effect the arrest, or that he does something beyond the mere
complaint to instigate the policeman to effect the arrest. In the instant case,
the mere mention by the first defendant of a crime to the police and giving the
names of the suspects to the police who then on their own volition went and
arrested the suspects does not amount to actual authorisation and direction.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></main>