AMOAKOH vs. HANSEN [1986]DLCA699

Date	1986-04-10
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1986]DLCA699

TAYLOR J.S.C

ABBAN J A

AMPIAH J.A.

J. K. AGYEMAN FOR THE APPELLANT.

NII ODOI-ANNAN (G. W. MENSAH WITH HIM) FOR THE RESPONDENT.

[1986]DLCA699
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >AMOAKOH <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>HANSEN <o:p></o:p>[COURT OF APPEAL, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1987-88] 2 GLR 87<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE
10 APRIL 1986<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

J. K. AGYEMAN FOR THE APPELLANT. <o:p></o:p>

NII ODOI-ANNAN (G. W. MENSAH WITH HIM) FOR THE
RESPONDENT.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

TAYLOR J.S.C, ABBAN AND AMPIAH JJ.A.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.<o:p></o:p>This is
an appeal lodged by a defendant in a High Court action from the judgment of the
then Chief Justice, sitting on 22 December 1983 as an additional judge of the
High Court, Accra. The facts of the case and the rival averments of the parties
at the trial pertaining to the substantive matters in controversy in the suit
are quite irrelevant as far as the legal questions posed by this appeal are
concerned. It is actually the procedural steps indulged in at the High Court
from the institution of the proceedings to its commencement in the absence of
the appellant right through to judgment and after trial that are rather the
gravamen of the complaints of the appellant. These steps in the proceedings
have been subjected to devastating criticism by learned counsel for the
appellant in arguments which in my opinion deserve the utmost consideration in
view of the fact that the trial was conducted before an unquestionably
experienced and able legal personage as the then Chief Justice of the Republic.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The strictures
of learned counsel, understandably advanced in a commendably respectful and
persuasive manner in the best tradition of the legal profession, were
transparently severe and trenchant and with the statutory authorities quoted in
support so overwhelmingly impressive that quite frankly to save ourselves the
unpleasantness of having to make embarrassing pronouncements and in order to
pre-empt duplicity of suits were we to find them valid, we took the
unprecedented step, some days long after we had heard the arguments, of
inviting counsel on both sides to a sitting in chambers in an effort to try
politely to effect settlement. We did this deliberately on the authority of
section 67 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) and we did so without touching on
the respective merits of the substantive claims of the parties. Regretfully,
our endeavours woefully failed and therefore we cannot in the circumstances
avoid any longer the responsibility which our judicial office imposes on us of
handing down our own decision, untramelled by any settlement.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>A resume
in chronological order of the relevant statutory and non-statutory but hardly
innocuous procedural steps taken by the parties and the High Court from the
date of the inception of the writ to the date of the commencement of the said
trial is in the circumstances essential for an understanding of the complaints
of the appellant and the cause of our own apparent discomfiture.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>In this
libel action the writ accompanied by a statement of claim was taken on 2
December 1982 on behalf of the plaintiff who at all material times was the
Provisional National Defence Council Secretary for the Interior. It was against
the appellant as the first defendant and three other defendants (hereinafter
referred to as the second, third and fourth defendants). Appearance was entered
by the solicitor for the second, third and fourth defendants on 9 December
1982. On 4 January 1983 a joint statement of defence was filed for the second,
third and fourth defendants and on 11 January 1983 the first defendant had his
statement of defence also filed.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>On 3
February 1983 the plaintiff by his solicitor filed one composite reply to the
statement of defence of all the four defendants and on 11 February 1983 an
application to join a fifth defendant to the suit was also filed on his behalf
the application for joinder was not served on the first defendant but it was
served on the fifth defendant. On 18 March 1983 the application was granted by
Mrs Justice Striggner-Scott, and the suit was on that date adjourned sine die.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>There is
no indication whatsoever on the record that the party joined as the fifth
defendant entered appearance and a perusal of the High Court docket in the case
reveals no appearance, nevertheless on 13 June 1983, about three months after the
summons for directions has been filed, the fifth defendant filed a statement of
defence which was never served on the first defendant. It stands to reason
therefore that the fifth defendan</main>