MAINOO vs. THE REPUBLIC [1986]DLHC941

Date	1986-06-13
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1986]DLHC941

FRANCOIS J.S.C.

KWAKU BAAH FOR THE APPELLANT.

KYEI-NTI FOR THE REPUBLIC.

[1986]DLHC941
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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MAINOO<o:p></o:p>

{HIGH COURT, ACCRA} <o:p></o:p>

[1984-86] 2 GLR 727<o:p></o:p>

DATE:
13 JUNE 1986<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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KWAKU
BAAH FOR THE APPELLANT. <o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
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FRANCOIS J.S.C.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.S.C.<o:p></o:p>The
appellant questions the legitimacy of his conviction based on his alleged
failure to exercise due care and attention on the Dodowah road, when clear
findings for such a conclusion were not made by the trial magistrate.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The facts
are not complex. The appellant was negotiating a curve near Dodowah Zongo when
his bus came into collision with a Peugeot caravan which was proceeding in the
opposite direction. The caravan sped on and could only come to a stop when its
progress was halted by a telegraph pole which was providentially in its way.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The prosecution
led evidence that the appellant had hogged the road. This evidence ‘was
partisan in the sense that it came from occupants of the Peugeot caravan whose
non-neutrality could not be concealed. But the magistrate did not expressly
rely on that evidence nor did he set it against the appellant’s contention that
the excessive speed of the Peugeot caravan was the sole cause of the accident.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>Though a
sketch of the scene was available showing the dimensions of the road and the
width occupied by both vehicles, and the magistrate had reinforced his mental
image with a personal inspection of the locus in quo, it does not appear that
much profit was derived either from the wealth of material available or the
exercise of inspection. The topography of a curve on a hillock just at the
approaches of a town, would itself call for care and circumspection from
vehicular road users, and one expected the magistrate to be unhesitant in the
cataloguing facts that would support his conclusions on a finding of
carelessness. On the contrary, however, the magistrate concerned himself with
general observations whose tenor was a blanket condemnation of bus drivers. His
ex cathedra pronouncement that municipal bus drivers vaunted the size of their
vehicles and would therefore yield no room to other road users he termed “small
fry”, was an extraneous comment irrelevant to the issue and unrelated to his
duty of ascertaining the facts.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>It was
valiantly argued by counsel for the Republic, that since the magistrate had
commended the driver of the Peugeot car for possessing the presence of mind not
to brake in the circumstances and reserved all his disparaging and
uncomplimentary epithets for bus drivers in general, and had moreover followed
this with a conviction, the only permissible inference was a finding against
the appellant of carelessness and inattentiveness in the control and management
of his vehicle in breach of section 18 (1) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, 1952
(No. 55 of 1952). On that argument, the absence of the magical words, “I find”,
should not vitiate the conviction. But the law prescribes a mandatory procedure
for the due progress of a trial from the inception to its conclusion. A verdict
at the end of a trial must be arrived at upon a consideration of the facts and
arguments for and against. The magistrate as arbiter, must weigh the pros and
cons and make his findings upon which his conclusions and reasons rest. Both
findings and reasons are subject to analytical scrutiny on appeal. If there are
no findings, an appellate court is disabled from determining whether the
magistrate’s conclusions are justified, except in the rare cases where
overwhelming evidence points only one way. Where no findings are made, the
courts have regarded the trial as a nullity. Thus in Nubuor v. Ampadu, Court of
Appeal, 31 May 1960, Cyclostyled Judgments, January-June 1960 at 97, the court
held a trial unsatisfactory where findings of fact upon which a judgment should
be based had not been made. The court adopted the English Court of Appeal decision
in Craven v. Craven (1957) 107 L.J. 505, C.A. as decisive of the matter. In
that case their lordships of the House of Lords held:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
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