QUARSHIE vs. BOSSO [1987]DLHC2055

Date	1987-12-04
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1987]DLHC2055

OMARI-SASU J.

EDWIN OPOKU FOR THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

M. EVANS QUAYSON (MRS.) FOR THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

[1987]DLHC2055
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">QUARSHIE<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">vs.<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">BOSSO<o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1992] 1 GLR 77<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="margin-bottom:5.0pt;text-align:right;
mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">Date: 4
DECEMBER 1987<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p>EDWIN OPOKU FOR THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

M. EVANS QUAYSON (MRS.) FOR THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. <o:p></o:p>

</div>JUDGMENT OF OMARI SASU J.<o:p></o:p>This is an appeal by the defendant-appellant against the decision
of the Family Tribunal, Accra dated 17 December 1986 which decision was entered
in favour of the plaintiff-respondent.<o:p></o:p>The substance of the decision of the said family tribunal is that
the appellant is the father of the respondent’s child named Kwesi Nyan Quarshie
and since the appellant has failed to maintain his said son since December 1983
he, the appellant, is liable to the respondent’s claim.<o:p></o:p>From the records the facts that gave rise to the original suit
before the Family Tribunal, Accra are in the main not in dispute and may be
stated briefly as follows: Towards the end of 1980 the parties were married
under customary law and they cohabited in the matrimonial home provided by the
appellant in Accra.<o:p></o:p>On 11 October 1981 the respondent delivered a baby boy and the
appellant performed the naming ceremony of the child who was named Kwesi Nyan
Quarshie after the appellant’s grandfather. The appellant followed the child’s
naming with formal registration of the birth of the child. In December 1983,
however, the appellant ceased to maintain the respondent and the child and he
managed to get customary divorce of the respondent because he, the appellant,
claimed he had come to realise that the child was not his child.<o:p></o:p>When the child Kwesi was growing up the appellant said the child
bore resemblance to the respondent but not to him. Furthermore, a Mr. Ababio
who was a former friend of the respondent prior to the respondent’s marriage
had been seen paying visits to the respondent in suspicious circumstances
during the marriage and finally blood tests conducted on the parties and the
child had shown that the child could not possibly be the child of the
appellant.<o:p></o:p>When the respondent instituted the original action against the appellant
before the Family Tribunal, Accra the said tribunal ordered the parties and the
child to submit themselves to blood tests. These were done and the results,
according to exhibit Z, also showed that the appellant could not be said to be
the father of the child. Notwithstanding this, the family tribunal held finally
that it was wrong in law that the blood tests were ordered to be taken as the
family tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the order for the blood tests of
the parties and the child and judgment was therefore entered in favour of the
respondent with consequential orders for payment of maintenance allowances and
costs to the respondent.<o:p></o:p>In this court, learned counsel for the parties have argued on the
merits and defects of the said blood tests either in support of or against the
decision of the family tribunal.<o:p></o:p>Once the facts which gave rise to this case and also to this
appeal are not in dispute the issues to be examined and a decision based
thereon appear to be (a) the law applicable in deciding on paternity suits
before the family tribunal; and (b) the value of blood tests in deciding on
paternity suits before the family tribunal.<o:p></o:p>On the question of the choice of law, section 19(1) of the
Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4) permits, inter alia, the use of “. . . any
memorandum published by authority in reference to the enactment . . .” as an
aid to the construction of the enactment. At Part IV of the Memorandum to the
Maintenance of Children Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 133) it is stated, inter alia, in
relation to section 18 of the Decree that: “Under the section, a Tribunal
[family tribunal] is to observe the procedure and retain the powers that a
District Court observes and exercises in its civil jurisdiction.” (The emphasis
is mine.) Section 18 (4) of S.M.C.D. 133 emphatically states, inter alia: “a .
. . [Family] Tribunal shall exercise all the powers of a District Court.”<o:p></o:p>The next question that must be answered is what jurisdiction has a
district court in paternity suits? The answer to this is to be found in the
Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), s. 37(1) (f) which states:<o:p></o:p>