APPIAH vs. BIANI [1988]DLHC2064

Date	1988-01-29
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1988]DLHC2064

LUTTERODT J

KUSI MINKA FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

FRIMPONG BOADU FOR THE DEFENDANT.

[1988]DLHC2064
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">APPIAH<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">vs.<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">BIANI<o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1991] 1 GLR 155<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="margin-bottom:5.0pt;text-align:right;
mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in;mso-padding-alt:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">Date: 29
JANUARY 1988<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p>KUSI MINKA FOR THE PLAINTIFF.<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

FRIMPONG BOADU FOR THE DEFENDANT. <o:p></o:p>

</div>JUDGMENT OF LUTTERODT J<o:p></o:p>This originating summons is brought by the widow of the late Joseph
Kwame Appiah, Mrs. Rose Lily Appiah, on behalf of herself and her three infant
children against the mother of the deceased, Madam Ama Biani. At the time the
deceased died he was said to be possessed, among other things, of an
uncompleted building which is a storey building and which had reached lintel
level. It was when the plaintiff’s counsel’s letter sought to have this
property vested in the plaintiff that a dispute arose as to whether this
building is a house within the meaning of the Intestate Succession Law, 1985
(PNDCL 111), s 4 (see exhibit A attached to the affidavit). Consequently, the
plaintiff caused her solicitors to issue this originating summons for a
determination of the following:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:19.5pt;mso-add-space:auto;
text-align:justify;text-indent:-19.5pt;mso-pagination:none;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo4;
border:none;mso-padding-alt:31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(a)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
whether upon the true
construction of section 4 of PNDCL 111 an uncompleted house is a house;<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:19.5pt;mso-add-space:auto;
text-align:justify;text-indent:-19.5pt;mso-pagination:none;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo4;
border:none;mso-padding-alt:31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(b)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
whether upon the true
construction of section 4 of PNDCL 111 the uncompleted house of the late Joseph
Kwame Appiah being his self-acquired property should devolve on the widow
(spouse) and children; and<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:
5.0pt;margin-left:19.5pt;mso-add-space:auto;text-align:justify;text-indent:
-19.5pt;mso-pagination:none;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo4;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">(c)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
an order that the house be
given to Madam Lily Appiah and the three children of the deceased.<o:p></o:p>What at this stage was thought not to raise any questions of fact
turned otherwise. In her affidavit in opposition, by paragraphs 6 and 7, she
denied that the house was the self-acquired property of the deceased. She
claimed that upon her son’s request she contributed an amount of ¢500,000 to
secure cement, sand and stones to build the said dwelling house at East Legon
which he could use jointly with the family. By paragraph 11 therefore she
claimed that she contributed to the construction of the said building. In the
affidavit opposing the application, however, nowhere did the defendant allege
that the building was not a house. In actual fact in her paragraph 6 she
described the structure not as a hangar or a workshop but a dwelling house.
Nevertheless the first question still remains to be answered. And I would
answer in the affirmative. The natural question is what are my reasons for so
deciding. I think I should first reproduce the relevant law, it reads:<o:p></o:p>“4. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Law—<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:
5.0pt;margin-left:.5in;mso-add-space:auto;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in;
mso-pagination:none;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo1;border:none;mso-padding-alt:31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;
mso-border-shadow:yes">(a)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
where the estate includes only one house the surviving spouse or
child or both of them, as the case may be, shall be entitled to that house and
where it devolves to both spouse and child, they shall hold it as
tenants-in-common.”<o:p></o:p>Unfortunately the law does not define what is meant by a house or
what it includes. I do not think they can be faulted. They never thought that
there would be any difficulty about this. Actually the problem raised here is
simply not what is meant by a house but whether an uncompleted house is a
house. This leads us to the vexed question of interpretation of statutes. I
have no decided case to help me on this issue of w</main>