BULLEY-NEEQUAYE vs. BULLEY-NEEQUAYE [1989]DLHC1996

Date	1989-07-11
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1989]DLHC1996

BROBBEY J.

S. F. GOODHEAD FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

NAANA NKETIA ( WITH HER G. FRANCOIS) FOR THE DEFENDANT.

[1989]DLHC1996
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													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" ><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">BULLEY-NEEQUAYE<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">vs.<o:p></o:p><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;
mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;mso-bidi-font-family:&quot;Book Antiqua&quot;;
color:#00B0F0">BULLEY-NEEQUAYE<o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1992] 1 GLR 165<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

</div>COUNSEL:<o:p></o:p>S. F. GOODHEAD FOR THE PLAINTIFF.,<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

NAANA NKETIA ( WITH HER G. FRANCOIS) FOR THE DEFENDANT. <o:p></o:p>

</div>JUDGMENT OF BROBBEY J.<o:p></o:p>On 26 October 1978 the defendant, Mrs. Alicia Bulley-Neequaye,
obtained an adoption order from the High Court presided over by the late
Griffiths-Randolph J. The precise wording of the order which was exhibited in
the course of arguments of this application was this:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“Upon the reading of an application made by Alicia Edith
Bulley-Neequaye, it is hereby ordered under and by virtue of the Adoption Act,
1962 (Act 104) and the relevant legislation made thereunder that the child
Christiana Okailey Amina, a juvenile, be adopted by the said Alicia Edith
Bulley-Neequaye as her lawful child for all purposes whatsoever, legal and
equitable, and that the child be known as Christiana Okailey Amina
Bulley-Neequaye according to the desire of the applicant herein expressed in
the application, the mother of the child having consented to the adoption.”<o:p></o:p>Barely two years later, the plaintiff herein, Mr. Eric
Bulley-Neequaye, issued a writ applying for the adoption order to be set aside
on grounds of irregularity. This ground was later amended to read that of
nullity, that is that the adoption order should be set aside on the ground that
that order was a nullity.<o:p></o:p>Miss Nketia who appeared for the defendant has raised a
preliminary objection questioning the locus standi of the plaintiff to
institute the present proceedings. In arguing the objection, Miss Nketia
contended that the plaintiff was in no way connected with the adoption
proceedings of 1978 which culminated in the order already read out. To that
extent, the plaintiff was a total stranger to the adoption proceedings. She
contended further that being a total stranger, the plaintiff could not by law
apply to set aside the adoption order. She founded that submission on the
authorities of Gbago v. Owusu [1972] 2 G.L.R. 252 at 253; Jacques v. Harrison
(1883) 12 Q.B.D 136 and Akwei v. Akwei [1961] G.L.R. 212.<o:p></o:p>Replying, Mr. Goodhead, who appeared for the plaintiff, contended
that the name “Bulley-Neequaye” is peculiarly associated with a special Ga
family in Accra of which the plaintiff is a member and that is how the
plaintiff acquired that name. The name “Bulley-Neequaye” given to the child
after the adoption is traceable to the plaintiff ‘s family and that gave him
the locus standi to bring the instant action. It was part of his argument that
it takes two to have a child and since the adoption order was obtained during
the subsistence of his marriage to the defendant, the defendant’s child could
be foisted on him as the putative father of a child whose adoption he never
consented to. He contended further that the defendant was a non-Ghanaian when
she applied for the adoption order but the order was not made provisional for
six months as required by section 7 of Act 104. Instead it was made absolute on
the day it was made and that made the order a nullity for non-compliance with
the said section 7. Mr. Goodhead maintained that he did not apply for a review
but applied for the order to be set aside on the ground of nullity. On the
authority of Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. he contended that since
the plaintiff did not apply for a review Akwei v. Akwei (supra) was
inapplicable to the instant case.<o:p></o:p>In answer, Miss Nketia submitted that a man has no exclusive right
over the use of a name, relying on Cowley v. Cowley [1901] A.C. 450 at 460,
H.L.<o:p></o:p>There is no doubt at all that the plaintiff herein was not a party
to the 1978 adoption proceedings. There is no evidence that he signed any of
the papers on the adoption. He did not even appear during the hearing of the
adoption application; neither was he represented, as evidenced by the adoption
proceedings exhibited by the defendant herein. The wording of the adoption
order as already read in no way covers the plaintiff. It exclusively limits the
person applying for the order to the defendant and does not make the child
adopted as the child of the marriage with Mr. Bulley-Neequaye. It is therefore
erroneous to contend that the adoption will make the plaintiff the putative
father of the child adopted. As Miss Nketia rightly pointed out, Act 104, s.
1(3) perfectly entitles an individual person to apply for adoption, be she
married or single. In the instant case, the facts show beyond any measure of
doubt that the defendant applied as the sole applicant and never involved the
plaintiff in any way.<o:p></o:p>All the authorities indicate that a total stranger cannot apply to
set aside a judgment to which he was not a party. In Gbago v. Owusu (supra) the
applicant who had sold out his entire interest in a piece of land a</main>