IJANYI AND OTHERS vs. DE SIMONE LTD [1989]DLHC591

Date	1989-11-03
Suit No.
Citation No.	[1989]DLHC591

PIESARE AG. J.

L. L. MENSAH FOR THE PLAINTIFFS.

V. C. DOEGAH (FOR W. FUGAH) FOR THE DEFENDANTS.

[1989]DLHC591
																																						<div class="restriction-wrapper">
														<div class="container-lg">
															<div class="row">
																<div class="col-md-12 restricted-content">
																	<div class="restricted-content-img-wrapper">
																		<div class="lock-icon bounce-7">
																			<img class=""
																				src="https://www.dennislawgh.com/dl-assets/dl-images/lock-content.png"
																				alt="Subscription based content">
																		</div>
																	</div>
																	 
																		<a href="https://www.dennislawgh.com/login"
																		class="btn btn-primary btn-lg"
																		style="font-family: 'open sans'; text-transform: capitalize; border-radius: 8px"> 
																		Login to Read Full Case </a>
																	 
																	
																</div>
															</div>
														</div>
													</div>
													<main id="main" class="content" style="min-height: 60rem" >IJANYI AND OTHERS <o:p></o:p>vs. <o:p></o:p>DE SIMONE LTD <o:p></o:p>[HIGH COURT, ACCRA]<o:p></o:p>[1989-90] 1 GLR 133<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 1.0pt 0in">

DATE:
3 NOVEMBER
1988<o:p></o:p>

</div>COUNSEL:&nbsp;&nbsp; <o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

V. C. DOEGAH (FOR W. FUGAH) FOR THE
DEFENDANTS.<o:p></o:p>

</div>CORAM:
<o:p></o:p><div style="mso-element:para-border-div;border:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;
padding:0in 0in 0in 0in">

PIESARE AG. J.<o:p></o:p>

</div><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>JUDGMENT OF PIESARE J.<o:p></o:p>On 3
November 1988, I dismissed the claim with ¢10,000 costs to the defendants. I
now proceed to give my reasons.<o:p></o:p>The case
of the plaintiffs shows that the four plaintiffs were painters in the
employment of the defendants until some time in the afternoon of 11 December 1980
when the plaintiffs were assigned some painting job, and they worked on the job
up to noon and had their break. It was their case that after the break they went
to the outhouse to mix some fresh paints. That while they were at the outhouse,
the managing director came to them; he asked them to pack all the paints into
his car, and they did; he then drove the plaintiffs in his car to his office,
and dismissed them from their employment for allegedly sleeping on duty,
without giving the plaintiffs any opportunity to explain themselves. They were
asked to collect their entitlements but they refused to do so, and took this
action.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>The
plaintiffs deny that they were sleeping on duty. The defendants did not give
evidence. Their defence was only indicated to the plaintiffs through the
cross-examination of the first and second plaintiffs. The court was therefore
deprived of the opportunity to assess the creditability of the managing
director, by weighing his sworn testimony as against the evidence of the second
plaintiff in particular, who gave evidence before me. I saw the second
plaintiff in the box, and I had no reason to disbelieve his evidence. I
accepted his evidence in the circumstance, to be the truth, that the plaintiffs
were not sleeping on duty.<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>But that
is not the end of the matter. For, even if the managing director dismissed the
plaintiffs without a good cause, the question is, what law or term of
employment has the dismissal contravened? I pose this question because in the
case of Morgan v. Parkinson Howard Ltd. [1961] 2 G.L.R. 68 at 70 Ollennu J. (as
he then was) stated the law as follows:<o:p></o:p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;
margin-left:.5in;text-align:justify;mso-pagination:none;border:none;mso-padding-alt:
31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt 31.0pt;mso-border-shadow:yes">“In a
claim for wrongful dismissal it is essential that the plaintiff should prove
the terms of his employment and then prove either that the determination of the
employment is in breach of the terms of his agreement, or that the
determination is in contravention of the statutory provisions for the time
regulating employment. His claim cannot succeed if he fails to satisfy the
court on these points.”<o:p></o:p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>I adopt
this principle as part of my judgment.<o:p></o:p>In the
instant case; the plaintiff did not lead any evidence as to any collective
agreement existing between the plaintiffs and the defendants and as to the
relevant terms of that agreement which the dismissals contravened, nor did they
lead any evidence as to the provisions of any statute which the dismissals
contravened. It is not sufficient merely for a plaintiff to say that he has
been dismissed by his employer in circumstances which cannot be justified. He
must go further to show that by the dismissal, the employer has contravened
their mutual agreement or some statutory provisions. In the absence of this, he
fails. I was satisfied in the result that upon the authority of the Morgan case
(supra) the instant claim was misconceived. I therefore dismissed it with the
costs stated. The parties may advise themselves accordingly.<o:p></o:p>

<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></main>